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THE LONG PROCESS OF CHANGE: THE 1990




An airplane crashes in an Iowa corn field. Is it ethical for New
York lawyers to place advertisements in Iowa newspapers offering
their legal services to persons affected by the crash?
A 60-year old male lawyer routinely calls the female court clerk,
"honey." Should he be subject to discipline for his conduct?
Firm A is defending its client, Acme Company, in a product liabil-
ity suit brought by Firm B on behalf of a client. Bob Cooper, an
associate at Firm A who occasionally has written memos of law on
product liability matters for Acme Company, leaves Firm A and
joins the corporate department of Firm B. May Firm A move to
have Firm B disqualified from the representation? Does it make a
difference if Firm B screens Cooper from the case?
Questions like these have been the subject of intensive debate in the
past few years, as lawyers have examined whether the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, effective in New York since 1970 (Original
Code) and amended in 1978 (1970 Code),' provides adequate gui-
dance to lawyers facing legal and ethical problems in the 1990s. The
debate began in earnest in 1980 when the American Bar Association
(ABA) proposed to replace the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (Model Code)2 with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
* The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and are not
meant to reflect the opinion of the Committee or any of its members.
** Member, New York State Bar Association. Ms. Gross was a member of the New
York State Bar Association committee that recommended most of the changes described
in this Article. An earlier version of this Article appeared in the New York Law Journal
on March 8, 9 and 12, 1990. Gross, Amendments to New York's Code of Professional
Responsibility, N.Y.L.J., March 8, 1990, at 1, col. 1, March 9, 1990, at 2, col. 3, March
12, 1990 at 2, col. 3.
1. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (McKinney 1970) [herein-
after ORIGINAL CODE], as amended April 29, 1978 [hereinafter 1970 CODE], as amended
September 1, 1990 [hereinafter 1990 CODE]. For ease of reference, the portions of the
1990 CODE and the 1970 CODE referred to in this Article are reproduced in relevant part
in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
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(Model Rules).' The New York State Bar Association (NYSBA or
State Bar) passed a milestone in June, 1987 when it approved signifi-
cant amendments to both the 1970 Code's Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules, subject to adoption of the proposed Disciplinary
Rules by the New York's four Appellate Divisions.' The Appellate
Divisions adopted amendments to the Disciplinary Rules, effective as
of September 1, 1990,' which were confirmed by the State Bar, thus
resulting in the 1990 version of the Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility (1990 Code). The principal changes reflected in the
1990 Code include:
making a lawyer subject to discipline for unlawfully discriminating
in the practice of law (including hiring, promoting and determining
conditions of employment), provided that there has been a final
determination of discrimination by a tribunal other than a Depart-
mental Disciplinary Committee, DR 1-102(A)(6);
limiting the obligation of a lawyer to report Code violations by an-
other lawyer to conduct that affects the lawyer's honesty, trustwor-
thiness or fitness to practice law, DR 1-103;
making a supervisory lawyer responsible for misconduct of another
lawyer when the supervisor knows or should know of the miscon-
duct, at a time when the consequences of such misconduct may be
avoided or mitigated, and fails to take action, DR 1-104;
prohibiting a lawyer from charging a contingency fee in a domestic
relations matter involving a divorce or the amount of maintenance,
support, equitable distribution or property settlement, DR 2-
106(C);
authorizing forwarding fees not in proportion to the work done on
the matter, where the client consents to the employment of a new
lawyer, the total fees are not unreasonable and each lawyer as-
sumes joint responsibility for the representation, DR 2-107(A);
allowing a lawyer to withdraw an opinion after discovering that it
3. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were proposed by the American Bar
Association's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, also known as the
Kutak Commission. The first public discussion draft of the Model Rules was published
January 30, 1980. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft Janu-
ary 30, 1980). The Model Rules were first adopted by the American Bar Association
(ABA) on August 2, 1983. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990) [herein-
after MODEL RULES].
4. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the adoption
procedures of New York's four Appellate Divisions.
5. Joint Order of the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, First, Second, Third
and Fourth Judicial Departments, In the Matter of the Adoption of the Disciplinary
Rules of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (April 5, 1990) (as yet unpub-
lished order) (adopting the 1990 amendments). See supra note 1.
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was based on inaccurate information or is being used in further-
ance of a crime or fraud, notwithstanding the fact that such a with-
drawal may implicitly reveal a confidence or secret of the client,
DR 4-101(C)(5);
providing guidelines regarding when a lawyer should reveal a cli-
ent's intention to commit a crime, EC 4-7;
authorizing a law firm to continue representing a client where one
of the firm's partners or associates is disqualified from further rep-
resentation because he or she may be a witness in the proceeding,
DRs 5-101(B), 5-102;
codifying the "substantial relationship" test for determining con-
flicts of interest between a current and former client, DR 5-108;
changing the standards for trial publicity from a listing of generally
permitted communications to a prohibition of only those commu-
nications that a lawyer reasonably should know will have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding, DR 7-107;
codifying the principles governing conflicts of interest when a law-
yer moves between government and private practice, DR 9-102(B);
and
making the 1990 Code gender neutral.
Most of the amendments to the 1970 Code are the product of the
New York State Bar Association's Special Committee to Review the
Code of Professional Responsibility, known as the Jones Committee,
named after its chairman, former New York Court of Appeals Judge
Hugh R. Jones.6 The Jones Committee was the third special commit-
tee of the State Bar charged with considering the 1970 Code. The first
committee, chaired by Frank R. Rosiny of New York City, com-
mented extensively on the successive drafts of the Model Rules. Fol-
lowing the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules in August 1983,7 a
second committee, chaired by Ralph L. Halpern of Buffalo, recom-
mended adoption of a modified version of the Model Rules in a report
submitted to the State Bar in December, 1984 (Halpern Committee
Report).' The New York State Bar Association House of Delegates
6. The members of the Jones Committee were the Honorable Hugh R. Jones, His-
cock & Barclay, Syracuse, New York; James C. Blair, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton,
New York, New York (since retired); Marjorie E. Gross, Senior Vice President and Asso-
ciate General Counsel, Chemical Bank, New York, New York; Ralph L. Halpern,
Jaeckle Fleischmann & Muegel, Buffalo, New York; and Frank R. Rosiny, Rosiny &
Rosiny, New York, New York.
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER ADOPTION OF ABA
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(House of Delegates), voted to reject the Halpern Committee Report
at its November, 1985 meeting.9 The House concluded that, while
certain amendments to the 1970 Code might be warranted, a whole-
sale abandonment of its format or principles was unnecessary. Conse-
quently, the Jones Committee was appointed to recommend specific
amendments. 10
In June, 1987, the House of Delegates approved an amended Code
of Professional Responsibility, including the Preamble, Preliminary
Statement, Canons, Ethical Considerations1 and Disciplinary Rules,
subject to approval by the Appellate Divisions. In October, 1987, the
package of proposed amendments was transmitted to the Appellate
Divisions with the recommendation that such amendments be
adopted.1 2 To promote uniformity among the four judicial depart-
ments, the Appellate Divisions established an inter-department task
force comprised of two representatives of each department. That task
force, known as the Kane Committee, named after its chairman, Jus-
tice T. Paul Kane of the Third Department, recommended the adop-
tion of the State Bar's proposed amendments to the Disciplinary
Rules, with certain exceptions. 13 On April 5, 1990, the Appellate Di-
visions adopted a joint order setting forth a uniform set of amended
Disciplinary Rules to become effective September 1, 1990.14 The Ap-
pellate Divisions had amended or eliminated seven of the Disciplinary
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (December 14, 1984) [hereinafter HAL-
PERN COMMITTEE REPORT].
9. New York State Bar Association Minutes of the House of Delegates meeting,
November, 1985: Rejection of Halpern Committee Report recommending adoption of
modified version of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
10. These statements reflect the personal recollections of the author.
11. The Preliminary Statements to the 1970 Code and the 1990 Code characterize
Ethical Considerations as "aspirational in character" and state that an enforcing agency
"may find interpretive guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the
objectives reflected in the Ethical Considerations." 1970 CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary
Statement; 1990 CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement.
12. New York State Bar Association Minutes of the House of Delegates meeting,
June 26-27, 1987: Approval of amendments to the Lawyer's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, DRAFT OF THE LAWYER'S
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (October 5, 1987) (incorporating amendments
adopted by the House of Delegates April 11 and June 26-27, 1987) [hereinafter OCTOBER
1987 DRAFT].
13. See infra note 15 for the changes eventually made by the Appellate Divisions.
14. Joint Order of the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, First, Second, Third
and Fourth Judicial Departments, In the Matter of the Adoption of the Disciplinary
Rules of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (April 5, 1990) (as yet unpub-
lished order) (adopting the 1990 amendments). See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the Appellate Divisions' approval procedures for the State Bar's
proposed amendments to the Disciplinary Rules.
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Rules and one definition proposed by the State Bar. 5 Accordingly, at
its meeting in June, 1990, the House of Delegates voted to amend the
Disciplinary Rules that had been approved conditionally at its meet-
ing in June, 1987 to conform the Disciplinary Rules to those adopted
by the Appellate Divisions.
The purposes of this Article are to describe the significant changes
to the 1970 Code and to give a firsthand account of the amendment
process. Part I explains the process by which the Appellate Divisions
adopt Disciplinary Rules promulgated by the New York State Bar
Association. Part II discusses the specific amendments to the 1970
Code which became effective September 1, 1990. Part III summarizes
the overall results of the amendments to the Code.
II. Manner of Adoption
The New York State Bar Association traditionally has approved a
code of professional responsibility and has recommended formal
adoption by the Appellate Divisions.16 The Appellate Divisions do
15. Specifically, the Appellate Divisions added a proviso to DR 1-102(A)(6) on dis-
crimination; made supervisory lawyers responsible under DR 1-104 for conduct of subor-
dinates that they should have known about as well as conduct that they knew about;
eliminated DR 2-100, which formally incorporated by reference the court rules on adver-
tising; modified DR 2-101 to set forth the court rules on advertising; eliminated the State
Bar's proposed additions to DR 2-103 with respect to in-person solicitation; eliminated
proposed DR 7-103(C), which would have required prosecutors to obtain prior judicial
approval before issuing a subpoena to a lawyer when the prosecutor seeks to compel the
lawyer to provide evidence concerning a client; and amended DR 9-102 to incorporate
the court rules regarding maintenance of client trust accounts, books and records,
adopted in the First and Second Departments. Compare OcTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra
note 12, at 9-10, 22-33, 92-93, 116-17 with 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DRs 1-102(A)(6), 1-
104, 2-100, 2-101, 2-103, 7-103(C), 9-102.
16. The Appellate Divisions of the New York Supreme Court have jurisdiction over
all attorneys practicing law in the state. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1983).
The appellate division in each department is authorized to censure, suspend or disbar any
attorney who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or
misdemeanor or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 90 (McKinney 1983). Although section 487 of the Judiciary Law contains a definition
of misconduct, see N.Y. JUD. LAW § 487 (McKinney 1983), the court rules for each of
the Appellate Divisions have defined professional misconduct to include a violation of
any disciplinary rule of a code of professional responsibility adopted by the New York
State Bar Association. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.2 (1977) (First
Department); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.2 (1978) (Second Depart-
ment); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 806.2 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1022.17 (1978) (Fourth Department). The manner
in which amendments are adopted may be important in assuring the immunity of the
State Bar from prosecution under the antitrust laws for any rules that may be deemed to
have an anticompetitive effect. The state action doctrine, set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), holds that regulatory activities
of a bar association are entitled to such immunity where the activities are directed and
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not adopt an entire code, but only its disciplinary rules.' 7 Previously,
this was accomplished by means of a court rule making a violation of
a Disciplinary Rule professional misconduct for which a lawyer could
be disciplined.'I Thus, the Disciplinary Rules were incorporated by
reference into the court rules. Under this method of adoption, the
Appellate Divisions maintained a relatively passive role in establish-
ing rules of conduct for the legal profession. As the New York Court
of Appeals noted in In re Greene, "[t]he Code of Professional Respon-
sibility is ... an enactment of the New York State Bar Association
rather than the Legislature or any court."' 9
With regard to the recent amendments, the Appellate Divisions
adopted the Disciplinary Rules promulgated by the State Bar as sepa-
rate court rules instead of amending the existing court rules to refer to
the amended code as adopted by the State Bar. That is, the Discipli-
nary Rules are set forth in full in the court rules.2°
supervised closely by the state supreme court. See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising rule had been directly adopted by the state supreme court);
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (bar association regulatory
activities were immune if authorized by state law, even if neither compelled nor actively
supervised by the state).
17. This results in a strange dichotomy where the Preamble, Preliminary Statement,
Canons and Ethical Considerations are the province of the State Bar, and the Discipli-
nary Rules are recommended by the State Bar, but are ultimately the province of the
Appellate Divisions.
18. In the case of the Original Code, the First Department court rules incorporated
the Disciplinary Rules as amended periodically by the State Bar. N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 603.2 (1977) (First Department). Accordingly, amendments have been
automatically incorporated in the court rules. In the other departments, amendments to
the court rules have been necessary to effectuate amendments to the Code. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.2 (1978) (the Second Department also includes
as misconduct a violation of any canon of the former Canons of Professional Ethics,
which were superseded by the Code in 1970); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 806.2 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1022.17
(1978) (Fourth Department).
19. 54 N.Y.2d 118, 124, 429 N.E.2d 390, 393, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883, 886, (1984), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982).
20. The Joint Order adopted by the Appellate Divisions does not address the method
for setting forth the rules. It merely states that:
the Disciplinary Rules of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, an-
nexed hereto and made a part hereof, are hereby adopted by the Appellate Divi-
sions of the Supreme Court as minimum standards of conduct for attorneys in
the State of New York the violation of which shall subject the attorney to disci-
plinary action.
Joint Order of the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, First, Second, Third and
Fourth Judicial Departments, In the Matter of the Adoption of the Disciplinary Rules of
the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (April 5, 1990) (as yet unpublished
order) (adopting the 1990 amendments). The rules are expected to be set forth in a new
uniform part in the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regulations of the State of
New York, applicable in all four judicial departments.
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As long as the rules adopted by the State Bar and the Appellate
Divisions are identical, the change from incorporation by reference to
incorporation by annexation has little practical effect. It is possible,
however, that the decision to make the Disciplinary Rules rules of
court reflects a determination of the Appellate Divisions to take a
more active role in providing minimum rules of conduct for the pro-
fession. Since 1978, the Appellate Divisions increasingly have become
involved with the recommendations of the State Bar in this area;21 an
Appellate Division no longer need adopt each and every Disciplinary
Rule promulgated by the State Bar.2 2 A recent New York Court of
Appeals case is further evidence of this change. In Niesig v. Team ,23
the court noted that the Disciplinary Rules are "[a]pproved by the
New York State Bar Association and then enacted by the Appellate
Divisions."24
III. The 1990 Amendments
A. Preliminary Statement
Although the Appellate Divisions have adopted only the Discipli-
nary Rules, ethics committee opinions often cite Ethical Considera-
21. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Appellate
Divisions' role in amending the Disciplinary Rules on advertising.
22. The rules of the First Department specifically defined misconduct as violation of
any disciplinary rule of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by
the New York State Bar Association, effective January 1, 1970, as amended. The 1978
amendment to the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility was therefore automati-
cally incorporated into the court rules of the First Department. The court rules of the
other departments had to be amended when the NYSBA revised the Code in 1978. These
court rules therefore referred to the Disciplinary Rules as amended through May 1, 1978.
Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.2 (1977) with N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.2 (1978) (Second Department); see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 806.2 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 1022.17 (1978) (Fourth Department).
23. 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990).
24. Id. at 369, 558 N.E.2d at 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (1990). The court also con-
cluded that, in certain cases, it was not required to follow the exact meaning of the Disci-
plinary Rules:
While unquestionably important, and respected by the courts, the Code does
not have the force of (decisional or statutory) law (See [Estate] of Weinstock, 40
N.Y.2d 1, 6 [351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976)]).... That distinction is
particularly significant when a Disciplinary Rule is invoked in litigation, which
in addition to matters of professional conduct by attorneys, implicates the inter-
ests of nonlawyers. In such instances, we are not constrained to read the rules
literally or effectuate the intent of the drafters, but look to the rules as guide-
lines to be applied with due regard for the broad range of interests at stake.
Id. at 369, 558 N.E.2d at 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
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tions or Canons2" and some lawyers fear that a lawyer may be
disciplined for violating an Ethical Consideration 26 or for conduct not
specifically prohibited by a Disciplinary Rule. The Jones Committee
added a section to the Preliminary Statement that warns lawyers of
this possibility:
[c]onduct that does not appear to violate the express terms of any
Disciplinary Rule nevertheless may be found by an enforcing
agency to be the subject of discipline on the basis of a general prin-
ciple illustrated by a Disciplinary Rule or on the basis of an ac-
cepted common law principle applicable to lawyers. 27
The Committee's Source Note2" indicates that the purpose of the
above paragraph is to "clarify" that attorneys may be subject to disci-
pline "beyond the express terms of the Disciplinary Rules."'29 Many
lawyers may be surprised to learn that the 1990 Code places such
discretion in disciplinary authorities. The adoption of broad ethical
principles would seem to give lawyers wide latitude in determining
how to act. Although the Jones Committee did not advocate broad-
ening the grounds for discipline,3" the possibility exists that discipli-
nary authorities will use this new warning to extend further the
general principles of the 1990 Code. Ironically, that the Appellate
Divisions adopted the Disciplinary Rules but not the Ethical Consid-
erations as court rules may indicate their belief that lawyers should be
subject to discipline only for a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
B. Definitions
Only two changes in the definitions section of the 1970 Code have
been made. The first change concerns the term "law firm." The origi-
nal definition referred only to professional legal corporations. Court
cases or ethics opinions, however, have applied the term to legal serv-
25. See HALPERN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at nn. 15-19 and accompanying
text.
26. See, e.g., In re Justices of the Appellate Division, First Dep't v. Erdmann, 33
N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973) (an isolated violation of the Ethi-
cal Consideration is insufficient to warrant discipline, but "persistent or general courses"
of conduct may be sufficient).
27. OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supranote 12, at 3; 1990 CODE, supra note 1, Preliminary
Statement.
28. Jones Committee's Source Notes are contained in the New York State Bar Asso-
ciation's October 5, 1987 Draft of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility,
which was transmitted to the Appellate Divisions. OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12.
29. OCTOBER 1987 DRAFr, supra note 12, at 3.
30. See generally OCTOBER 1987 DRAFr, supra note 12.
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ices organizations" and government law departments. 32 The term
conceivably may be applied to corporate law departments as well.
The Jones Committee revised the definition of "law firm" to indicate
that the term includes, "but is not limited to, a professional legal cor-
poration, the legal department of a corporation or other organization
and a legal services organization." This definition is similar to, but
broader than, the definition in the Model Rules which does not con-
tain the language "not limited to."'33
The Jones Committee failed to state whether the "not limited to"
language was meant to include government agencies. Determining
what is included in the term "law firm" is significant for matters of
vicarious disqualification under DR 5-105(D) in either the 1970 Code
or as amended in the 1990 Code. The subject of vicarious disqualifi-
cation when a private lawyer joins the government, however, is specif-
ically addressed in DR 9-101(B)(3).34 Thus, the definition of "law
firm" is not relevant for that purpose. Nevertheless, the distinction
potentially is relevant to the permission to share confidential informa-
tion contained in EC 4-2 and to the lawyer-witness restrictions of DR
5-102. For these purposes, there is no apparent reason why the term
"law firm" should not be interpreted to include a government law
department.
The second change in the definition section is an addition to the
definition of "tribunal" made by the Appellate Divisions. Under the
new definition, a tribunal is deemed "available" to hear a complaint of
discrimination when the tribunal would have jurisdiction to hear the
complaint.35
31. Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. App. 1971); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1309 (1975).
32. NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 492 (1978); NYSBA Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics, Op. 419 (1975) (applies vicarious disqualification and requires the reten-
tion of special counsel pursuant to Section 701 of the County Law, N.Y. COUNTY LAW
§ 701 (McKinney 1972)). Some courts and ethics committees, however, have been reluc-
tant to disqualify an entire prosecutor's office when one member is disqualified. See
United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945
(1982); State v. Fitzpatrick, 464 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1985); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975) (refuses to apply DR 5-105(D) to
disqualify an entire government agency because the government's ability to function
would be unreasonably impaired).
33. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.10 comment.
34. DR 9-101(B)(3) does not require vicarious disqualification of the government
when a private lawyer joins the government. This is tempered by DR 9-101(B)(1), which
states that, in general, neither a lawyer nor such lawyer's firm may represent a client in
connection with a matter in which such lawyer participated personally as a public officer
or employee.
35. For a discussion of the new disciplinary rule concerning discrimination, see infra
notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
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C. Canon 1 - Misconduct
1. Discrimination
One of the most significant changes to the 1970 Code is the adop-
tion of an Ethical Consideration and a Disciplinary Rule addressing
discrimination. The Ethical Consideration encourages lawyers to
avoid bias toward participants in court proceedings. 36 The new Disci-
plinary Rule subjects a lawyer to discipline for illegally discriminating
in the practice of law, but does so only after a finding of illegal dis-
crimination by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction where such a tri-
bunal is available. 7
The history of the adoption of these provisions is a long and tortu-
ous one. The anti-discrimination provisions are the result of two sep-
arate proposals from State Bar committees. The Committee on
Minorities in the Profession proposed to prohibit discrimination in
hiring, promoting or otherwise determining conditions of employ-
ment, on nine bases, including race, color, religion, sex, age and
handicap.3
The Special Committee on Women in the Courts sought a far
broader prohibition against discrimination. As a result of a study of
discrimination in the courts,39 the Special Committee on Women in
the Courts advocated that the Bar Association provide that a lawyer
is prohibited from engaging in any conduct that would discriminate
or manifest bias on nine bases, including sex, color, race, religion, dis-
ability, age, marital status and sexual preference, in handling a legal
matter." The Jones Committee declined to recommend adoption of
either an Ethical Consideration or a Disciplinary Rule addressing dis-
crimination because the subject of discrimination was adequately cov-
ered by laws, such as the Federal anti-discrimination law4 and the
New York Human Rights Law,42 and was an inappropriate subject
for a code of ethics.43
36. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, EC 1-7.
37. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(6).
38. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON MINORITIES IN THE
PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES (April
2, 1987).
39. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
WOMEN IN THE COURTS (March 24, 1987) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE COURTS]; see
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN
THE COURTS (March 31, 1986).
40. WOMEN IN THE COURTS, supra note 39, at 49.
41. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
42. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982).
43. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMIT-
TEE TO REVIEW THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (February 28, 1987)
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The proposals regarding discrimination were discussed at both the
April and June, 1987 meetings of the House of Delegates. In April,
the House clearly did not wish to prohibit all discrimination. For
example, the House of Delegates supported the preservation of a law-
yer's ability to adopt affirmative action programs. The House of Dele-
gates, however, was inclined to make a formal statement prohibiting
at least certain kinds of discrimination; therefore, the House directed
the Jones Committee to synthesize the two special committees' pro-
posals into a single provision."
Between the April and June meetings, the Jones Committee con-
sulted with both special committees and offered for the consideration
of the House a single Ethical Consideration composed of two
sentences. The first sentence encouraged the lawyer to avoid unlawful
discrimination; the second sentence exhorted lawyers to avoid conde-
scension and to treat with dignity and respect all parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court employees and others involved in the legal process.
Nevertheless, the Jones Committee recommended rejection of the
proposal on the grounds that prohibiting a violation of a particular
law is inconsistent where, under DR 1-102(A)(3), other violations of
law constitute misconduct only if they involve moral turpitude, and
grievance committees are ill-equipped to act as quasi-human rights
commissions determining discrimination cases.
After extended debate, the House of Delegates agreed to divide the
special committees' concepts into an Ethical Consideration and a Dis-
ciplinary Rule. New EC 1-7 reads as follows: "A lawyer should
avoid bias and condescension toward, and treat with dignity and re-
spect, all parties, witnesses, lawyers, court employees and other per-
sons involved in the legal process."45 This language is similar to
language already appearing in EC 7-10.46
New DR 1-102(A)(6) as proposed by the House of Delegates would
have only provided that: "[a] lawyer shall not... unlawfully discrim-
inate in the practice of law, including discrimination in hiring, pro-
moting or otherwise determining conditions of employment, on the
basis of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, or marital
(committee recommendations concerning Disciplinary Rule on discrimination) [hereinaf-
ter FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT].
44. New York State Bar Association Minutes of the House of Delegates meeting,
Albany, New York, April 11, 1987: Report and Recommendations of Special Committee
to Review the Code of Professional Responsibility, at 4.
45. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, EC 1-7.
46. By restricting its prohibition to the infliction of needless harm, EC 7-10 presuma-
bly allows a lawyer certain latitude in examining witnesses. There is no indication that
the House of Delegates intended EC 1-7 to override EC 7-10 in the context of litigation.
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status. ' 47 The Appellate Divisions, however, were concerned about
the effect of the proposed Disciplinary Rule. Like the Jones Commit-
tee, the Appellate Divisions did not want to convert the Departmental
Disciplinary Committees into quasi-human rights commissions deter-
mining discrimination cases. Therefore, the Appellate Divisions ad-
ded a provision clarifying that, where a tribunal other than a
Departmental Disciplinary Committee (e.g., a court or the Human
Rights Commission) has jurisdiction, a complaint "of professional
misconduct"4 based on unlawful discrimination must be brought
before that tribunal. A certified copy of a final determination of un-
lawful discrimination by that tribunal constitutes prima facie evidence
of professional misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding. 9
The basic anti-discrimination provision prohibits all unlawful dis-
crimination on the eight named bases.50 Employment discrimination
is the most obvious form of prohibited discrimination.5 Courts also
have held it unlawful for a prosecutor or a defense attorney to make
peremptory challenges of jurors on the grounds of race and national
origin.5 2 Not all professional conduct of lawyers, however, will be
subject to the new provisions. The requirement that the discrimina-
tion be unlawful will have the practical effect of exempting very small
law firms from the prohibition. The New York Human Rights Law
prohibits employment discrimination only by "employers," and the
definition of employer excludes those with fewer than four persons in
his or her employ." Although EC 1-7 discourages bias, it is directed
at persons "involved" in the legal process. Similarly, DR 1-102(A)(6)
prohibits unlawful discrimination in the "practice" of law, which pre-
sumably commences at a point after legal representation has begun.
The eight bases upon which discrimination is prohibited are those
47. See OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 9.
48. Technically, such a complaint would be for unlawful discrimination rather than
for professional misconduct.
49. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(6).
50. Id.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982).
52. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (equal protection clause forbids a prose-
cutor to make a peremptory challenge to potential jurors solely on the basis of race);
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (although the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment or the fair cross-section component of the sixth amendment may
prohibit the exclusion from a jury of groups such as blacks, women and Mexican-Ameri-
cans, a group defined solely in terms of shared attitudes, such as people opposed to the
death penalty, may be excluded); People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555
N.Y.S.2d 647 (defense attorneys could not exercise peremptory challenges of jurors on
racial grounds), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
53. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (McKinney 1982).
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listed in the New York Human Rights Law.54 The House of Dele-
gates adopted the language of the Human Rights Law because the
terms used are defined at length and have been interpreted by both the
Human Rights Commission and the courts."
The House of Delegates approved one final recommendation of the
Jones Committee to eliminate gender bias: a proposal to make the
1990 Code gender-neutral. The House of Delegates did not approve
each drafting change, but rather delegated authority to the Jones
Committee to effect the changes. Although providing gender neutral-
ity involved hundreds of changes, 6 such changes were not intended to
affect the substance of any provision.
2. Reporting Misconduct
One of the hallmarks of the legal profession is its self-policing na-
ture. DR 1-103(A) 57 provided that a lawyer possessing unprivileged
knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 must report that knowledge to
a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the
violation. Several problems with this section existed. First, many
lawyers thought it unfair that they be required to report any violation
of the 1970 Code, no matter how trivial. Second, there was a general
perception that the broad proscription had been widely ignored, par-
ticularly as to violations that lawyers considered insignificant. Fi-
nally, a technical question arose regarding whether the reference to
"unprivileged" knowledge applied only to information protected by
the attorney-client privilege or to the broader category of "secrets" as
well.58
54. The New York Human Rights Law prohibits employment discrimination based
upon age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability or marital status. N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982). The Special Committee on the Role of Women in the
Courts recommended the inclusion of sexual preference in the list of prohibited bases of
discrimination.' WOMEN IN THE COURTS, supra note 39, at 49. This proposal was re-
jected by the House of Delegates. See OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 9.
55. See generally OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 8-9 and accompanying
Source Notes.
56. An exception to the widespread changes was Canon 2, which had been rendered
gender-neutral at the time of the 1978 advertising amendments. 1970 CODE, supra note 1,
Canon 2.
57. 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-103(A).
58. See OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 9 and accompanying Source Notes.
See 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101. There is conflicting authority as to the meaning
of "unprivileged knowledge." In interpreting the same phrase as it appears in DR 7-
102(B)(1) of the ABA Model Code, the ABA's Ethics Committee opined that it included
both confidences and secrets. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 341 (1975). The Ethics Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, however, concluded that it meant only "confidences." See Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of N.Y., Comm. of Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1990-3
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The amendments to DR 1-103(A) and EC 1-4 address the first
problem in the same manner as the Model Rules do;5 9 the amend-
ments limit the reporting obligation only to violations of'DR 1-102
that raise "a substantial question as to another lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness in other respects as a lawyer. '  The
amendments treat the final problem by specifying in both DR 1-
103(A) (reporting lawyer misconduct) and DR 1-103(B) (providing
evidence to an investigation of lawyer or judicial misconduct) that the
lawyer must disclose knowledge or evidence only when it is not pro-
tected as a confidence or secret.
3. Ethical Measures in Law Firms
When the House of Delegates considered the Halpern Committee
Report on the Model Rules, it specifically rejected Model Rule 5.2(b),
providing that, "[a] subordinate lawyer does not violate the rules of
professional conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervi-
sory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of profes-
sional duty. '61  Although this provision supplied much needed
assurance to a law firm associate who believes that the conduct of a
partner for whom he or she works is ethically questionable, it distin-
guished ethical responsibilities varying with a lawyer's age or with a
lawyer's title within the firm.
To provide guidance in ethical matters, the Jones Committee added
EC 1-8, suggesting that a law firm adopt compliance procedures to
the 1990 Code. These procedures include:
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Disciplinary Rules and that the conduct of non-
lawyers employed by the firm is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyers in the firm. Such measures may include
informal supervision and occasional admonition, a procedure
whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical
problems directly to a designated senior lawyer or special commit-
tee, and continuing legal education in professional ethics.62
This language, derived from comment 2 to Model Rule 5.1,63 should
provide some comfort to a lawyer who questions the ethical propriety
(1981). A more recent opinion of the State Bar Ethics Committee simply assumed that
"unprivileged" included both confidences and secrets. NYSBA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 531 (1981).
59. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 8.3(a).
60. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-103(A), EC 1-4.
61. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.2(B).
62. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, EC 1-8.
63. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.1 comment 2.
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of conduct engaged in by another lawyer in the same firm. Although
the provision is only an Ethical Consideration, and, thus, does not
mandate the use of firm ethics committees, the provision should en-
courage the use of such procedures, thereby ensuring that the affected
lawyer will not have to confront an ethical dilemma alone.
The 1970 Code did not delineate the responsibility of a supervisory
lawyer for the conduct of another lawyer or a non-lawyer. The Jones
Committee recommended an amended DR 1-104, which would have
made a supervisory lawyer responsible whenever such lawyer ordered
the conduct or knew of the conduct at a time when its consequences
could have been avoided or mitigated but failed to take reasonable
remedial action." Although this standard mirrored the standard con-
tained in Model Rule 5.1(c), 65 Model Rule 5.1 also gives lawyers an
affirmative duty to supervise subordinates.66 Model Rule 5. 1(b) states
that a lawyer with supervisory authority over another lawyer must
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to
the rules of professional conduct.67 The Jones Committee believed
that a supervisory lawyer should not be subject to discipline where
civil liability would not be imposed under Section 1505(a) of the Busi-
ness Corporation Law, which makes each shareholder, employee or
agent of a professional legal corporation liable for any negligent or
wrongful act or misconduct committed by a person rendering profes-
sional services under his or her direct supervision and control.68
The Appellate Divisions agreed with the sentiment in Model Rule
5. 1(b). Thus, they amended DR 1-104 to make a supervisory lawyer
responsible for the conduct of a subordinate when the supervisor
"knows or should have known of the conduct at a time when its conse-
quences can be avoided or mitigated" and fails to take action. 69 The
addition of this language effectively mandates adoption of the compli-
ance procedures recommended in new EC 1-8.
The amended DR 1-104 is consistent with recent case law in New
York indicating that partners may be held to a standard higher than
the standard provided by Section 1505(a) of the Business Corporation
Law.7 ° For example, Matter of Dahowski 7' involved a two-man law
firm where Partner A stole money from clients without the knowledge
64. OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 10.
65. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.1(c).
66. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.1.
67. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 5.1(b).
68. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1505(a) (McKinney 1986).
69. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-104.
70. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1505(a) (McKinney 1986).
71. 103 A.D.2d 354, 479 N.Y.S.2d 755 (2d Dep't 1984).
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of Partner B. Partner B was censured by the Second Department for
having failed "to oversee or review the record keeping of his law firm,
thereby contributing to the conversion by [Partner A] of funds en-
trusted to the law firm."72 The Client's Security Fund then sued Part-
ner B for reimbursement of moneys the Fund had paid to Partner A's
clients. In Client's Security Fund v. Grandeau,73 the New York Court
of Appeals unanimously held that Partner B could be held financially
responsible for negligence which permitted or assisted Partner A in
committing thefts or illegal acts: "[A]ny member of a partnership
may be liable for a conversion of property committed by a member of
the firm, even where the other members of the firm had no knowledge
of the offending partner's action."'74
D. Canon 2 - Making Legal Counsel Available
1. Advertising
The rules governing advertising remain substantially the same
under the 1990 amendments.
The 1970 Code provisions concerning advertising were the result of
a philosophical battle that followed the Supreme Court's decision in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.75 One school of thought, championed
by the State Bar, provided that advertising should be restricted to a
limited list of permissible items.76 The other ideology, advocated by
the more liberal Association of the Bar of the City of New York, fa-
vored a general proscription of statements that were false, misleading
or deceptive." The advertising rules adopted by the four Appellate
Divisions in 197878 and incorporated into the Code as DR 2-101 are
an exquisite compromise between these two approaches. The rules
begin with a general proscription against communications that are
false, deceptive or misleading or that "cast reflection on the legal pro-
fession as a whole. ' ' 79 The advertising rules also contain an exhorta-
tion that advertising not "contain puffery, self-laudation, claims
72. Id. at 355, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 755-56.
73. 72 N.Y.2d 62, 526 N.E.2d 270, 530 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1988).
74. Id. at 67, 526 N.E.2d at 273, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
75. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
76. NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 505 (1979).
77. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, ADVERTISING BY LAWYERS (January 19, 1978).
78. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.22 (1978) (First Department); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.22 (1978) (Second Department); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 806.15 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 1022.16 (1978) (Fourth Department).
79. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.22 (1978) (First Department); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.22 (1978) (Second Department); N.Y. COMP.
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regarding the quality of the lawyer's legal services, or claims that can-
not be measured or verified."8 The rules provide a list of information
that usually will not violate the general rules, as well as certain gen-
eral requirements with respect to broadcast ads and advertising of
fees."' Thus, the court rules provide maximum flexibility for lawyer
advertising while setting forth a safe harbor for lawyers interested in
fact-based advertising.
Given the specificity of the court rules, the State Bar believed there
was little additional guidance that could be supplied by the 1970
Code. Accordingly, in 1978, the State Bar added a new DR 2-100,s2
which maintained that a lawyer should not advertise in violation of
any statute8 3 or rule of court. DR 2-100 also provided for the incorpo-
ration by reference into DR 2-101 of any rule of court adopted by the
Appellate Divisions. The State Bar also added a revised DR 2-101,
fully setting forth the then-existing court rule.
Although this system worked fairly well, the incorporation by ref-
erence combined with the list in DR 2-101 may have been confusing
to some practitioners. For example, the court rules were amended to
add two additional requirements, but, because those requirements
were incorporated by reference under DR 2-100(B), the 1970 Code
was not reprinted to show their inclusion. The Jones Committee pro-
posed to delete the provisions of the court rule from DR 2-101(A)
through (J), and to incorporate them by reference instead. 4
The Appellate Divisions followed a different course. Rather than
having the 1990 Code incorporate the advertising rules by reference,
they decided that the advertising rules should remain in the 1990
Code and that the Disciplinary Rules should be adopted as rules of
the Appellate Divisions. The Appellate Divisions therefore deleted
DR 2-100, added paragraph k of the court rules as DR 2-101(K) and
added paragraph 1 of the court rules to DR 2-101(F). The result of
CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 806.15 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 1022.16 (1978) (Fourth Department).
80. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.22 (1978) (First Department); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.22 (1978) (Second Department); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 806.15 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 1022.16 (1978) (Fourth Department).
81. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.22 (1978) (First Department); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.22 (1978) (Second Department); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 806.15 (1978) (Third Department); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 1022.16 (1978) (Fourth Department).
82. 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-100. DR 2-100 was subsequently eliminated. See
generally 1990 CODE, supra note 1, Canon 2.
83. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 479 (McKinney 1983).
84. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 22-25.
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the Appellate Divisions' solution is the same, the rules governing ad-
vertising remain unchanged.
In addition, the meaning of to "cast reflection on the legal profes-
sion as a whole"8 5 is unclear. Presumably, the provision was intended
only to prohibit casting aspersion or adverse reflection. The Jones
Committee could do little about this lack of clarity, for it existed in
the court rules.
2. Dissemination of Professional Announcements
Once the Supreme Court declared that a lawyer ethically could
place truthful advertisements in a newspaper,8 6 a remaining critical
issue was whether a lawyer could mail the same truthful statements to
a targeted group of people.8 7 Several ethics committees and courts in
the State have held that information that may be placed in an adver-
tisement also may be mailed to any person.88 Accordingly, the lan-
guage in DR 2-102(A)(2) limiting the mailing of announcement cards
to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives has
been deleted. Under the general standard of DR 2-101(A), an an-
nouncement card may contain far more than the information set forth
in former DR 2-102(A)(2). As the introduction to DR 2-102(A) indi-
cates, paragraph (2) is merely a safe harbor.
3. Solicitation
Since the Supreme Court's decisions in In re Primus 9 and Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association,90 courts and ethics committees have
struggled to determine which forms of solicitation constitutionally
may be prohibited. In Ohralik, the Supreme Court recognized the
state interest in prohibiting classic ambulance chasing: "soliciting cli-
ents in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose
dangers that the State has a right to prevent."' The Court found that
in-person solicitation may exert undue pressure and may demand an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for the victim
85. 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-101.
86. Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
87. This issue is discussed more fully in the context of solicitation below, but a special
example of the issue occurs in connection with professional announcements. See infra
notes 89-116 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 505 (1979); Matter of Kof-
fler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 143, 412 N.E.2d 927, 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1980) ("Direct
mail solicitation of potential clients by lawyers is constitutionally protected commercial
speech which may be regulated but not proscribed."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
89. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
90. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
91. Id. at 449.
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to compare or reflect. 92 The. courts, however, have yet to determine
the lawyer's bounds where the circumstances involved do not pose the
dangers identified in Ohralik.
Advertisements targeted to a particular type of prospective client
and letters directed to persons known to have a particular type of
legal problem are permitted. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,93 a lawyer placed an advertisement composed of a line draw-
ing of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device and the question, "Did
you use this IUD?' 94 The Supreme Court found that the advertise-
ment did not invade the privacy of those who read it, and posed far
less of a risk of overreaching, coercion or undue influence than in-
person solicitation.95 In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 6 a law-
yer proposed to send letters to potential clients against whom foreclo-
sure suits had been filed. The Court held that such targeted mailings
could not be prohibited categorically. 97 The recipient would not be
confronted with the coercive presence of a trained advocate or pres-
sured for a yes-or-no-answer, but could ignore, discard or carefully
consider the offer of representation.9" Similarly, in Matter of von
Wiegen,99 an attorney sent a letter to persons injured in the collapse of
a walkway in a hotel ballroom. The New York Court of Appeals
found that the blanket prohibition of soliciting accident victims by
mail violated a lawyer's right of expression under the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.100
Section 479 of the New York Judiciary Law prohibits any person
from directly or indirectly soliciting legal business.,10 Following
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,102 section 479 has been held constitu-
tionally unenforceable in many respects.10 3 Consequently, the Jones
92. Id. at 457, 465.
93. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
94. Id. at 630.
95. Id. at 641-42.
96. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
97. Id. at 472-73.
98. Id. at 475.
99. 63 N.Y.2d 163, 166, 470 N.E.2d 838, 839, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (1984), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
100. Id. at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
101. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 479 (McKinney 1983).
102. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
103. See, e.g., Matter of Koffier, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 143, 412 N.E.2d 927, 929, 432
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981). But see Matter of Alessi,
60 N.Y.2d 229, 231, 457 N.E.2d 682, 683, 469 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1102 (1984); Matter of Greene, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 120, 429 N.E.2d 390, 391, 444
N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982) (mail solicitations directed
at real estate brokers). In Matter of Alessi, the Court of Appeals explained that Greene
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Committee concluded that section 479 no longer provided sufficient
guidance to practitioners. Moreover, the law in the area of in-person
solicitation is still in a state of evolution. The Jones Committee de-
cided that DR 2-103, which prohibited solicitation of employment
from a person who has not sought the lawyer's advice "in violation of
any statute or court rule," was inadequate. 1" Accordingly, it pro-
posed to add several requirements to the provision that solicitation
may not violate a law or court rule. Such requirements would have
prohibited in-person contact where the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that, because of the prospective client's physical, emo-
tional or mental state, he or she is unlikely to be able to exercise in-
dependent and reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer. The
requirements also would have prohibited both in-person and written
contact where the prospective client has asked not to be contacted or
the contact involves coercion, duress or harassment.10 5
The Jones Committee was criticized for producing the most liberal
solicitation rule in the country."°6 In actuality, the Committee's pro-
posal contained more conditions than the 1970 Code did. It was not
the Committee's intention to permit in-person solicitation on the day
the amendment became effective. Because section 479 of the Judici-
ary Law specifically prohibits solicitation,"°7 the additions made by
the Jones Committee regarding a prospective client's physical or emo-
tional state and involving coercion, duress or harassment would have
permitted a lawyer's solicitation of business only where consistent
did not ban all third-party mailings by attorneys, but was limited to mailings to real
estate brokers and others whose interests might "be more closely intertwined with those
of the attorney than with those of the client." 60 N.Y.2d at 234-35, 457 N.E.2d at 686,
469 N.Y.S.2d at 581. This encourages the argument that not all in-person solicitation
may be prohibited.
104. 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-103.
105. The Model Rules' approach to solicitation is quite different. MODEL RULES,
supra note 3, Rule 7.3. Although an earlier draft of the Model Rules would have treated
solicitation the same way as did the Jones Committee, the version of Model Rule 7.3
initially adopted by the ABA provided that a lawyer could not solicit professional em-
ployment by mail, in person or otherwise, if the solicitation was directed to a specific
person, or to persons known to need the kind of legal services the lawyer provided. After
the Supreme Court's Shapero decision, the ABA amended Model Rule 7.3 to require that
every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employ-
ment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter
include the words "advertising material" on the outside envelope and at the beginning
and ending of any recorded communication.
106. See Gillers, Amending the Ethics Code - Solicitation, Prepaid Plans, Fees,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
107. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of section 479.108
Nevertheless, the Appellate Divisions believed that the Jones Com-
mittee proposal invited in-person solicitation. Consequently, the Ap-
pellate Divisions decided to retain much of the existing language of
DR 2-103(A), which prohibits seeking professional employment from
a person who has not sought legal advice "in violation of any statute
or court rule."' 109 They made two additional changes in this provi-
sion. First, they made lawyers subject to the court rules "in the judi-
cial department in which the lawyer practices." 10 Second, they
deleted the sentence expressly providing that solicitation permitted by
DR 2-104 and advertising in accordance with DR 2-101 would not be
deemed solicitation in violation of DR 2-103. I 1l
The amendments permit one form of in-person solicitation. DR 2-
103(C)(3) allows a lawyer to request recommendations from another
lawyer or from organizations performing legal services. Lawyers have
traditionally requested referrals from other lawyers. Indeed, before
the 1978 amendments to Canon 2 regarding advertising, DR 2-103
prohibited only solicitation of laypersons.' 12 In Matter of Greene,' 13
the New York Court of Appeals held that a lawyer could not ask a
real estate broker to solicit clients for the lawyer, on the grounds that
the broker has a conflict of interest that may affect the recommenda-
tion." 4 Such a conflict of interest, however, is rarely present in a rec-
ommendation by a lawyer." I5 The Jones Committee's Source Notes
fail to indicate why a lawyer may request recommendations from or-
ganizations performing legal services." 6 Presumably, the reason is to
remedy DR 2-103(D) which allows the lawyer to accept referrals
from certain organizations that perform legal services or recommend
lawyers, but does not specifically authorize the lawyer to request such
108. See Matter of Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146-47, 412 N.E.2d 927, 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d
873, 875 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
109. See FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 28-29.
110. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-103(A).
111. Id.
112. Before the 1978 amendments, DR 2-103(a) provided, in relevant part:
DR 2-103 RECOMMENDATION OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT
(A) A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of
himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his
advice regarding employment of a lawyer.
ORIGINAL CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-103(A).
113. 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1035 (1982).
114. Id. at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
115. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1504
(1984) (approval of soliciting recommendations from lawyers).
116. See generally OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 28-33.
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a referral. A lawyer who has asked for such a recommendation from
a bona fide organization which recommends, furnishes or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries would still be subject to
the conditions contained in DR 2-103(D).
A second form of solicitation long treated with ambiguity by the
1970 Code has been clarified. DR 2-104(F) previously stated that if
success in asserting rights in a class action was dependent upon join-
ing additional parties, the lawyer could accept employment from
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder, but could
not seek such employment. The fine distinction between solicitation
of joinder and solicitation of employment may escape the persons con-
tacted. Thus, in light of the above-mentioned advertising and solicita-
tion case, the prohibition against seeking employment has been
deleted.
4. Legal Service Plans
DR 2-103(D)(4) encompasses acceptance of employment from legal
services organizations that recommend, furnish or pay for legal serv-
ices to members. The most common of these organizations are union
and corporate plans, usually backed by insurance, which provide legal
services to employees. DR 2-103(D)(4)(a) allowed lawyers to cooper-
ate with such an organization only if the organization did not profit
from rendering legal services or did not employ, direct or supervise
the lawyers unless it also assumed ultimate liability in the legal mat-
ter. Similarly, DR 2-103(D)(4)(e) allowed lawyers to cooperate with
a legal services organization only if the client was free to designate
any counsel, not if the client was required to employ a lawyer pro-
vided by the plan. This is referred to as the open-panel/closed-panel
distinction.
Profit versus non-profit and open-panel versus closed-panel choices
are outdated and should be changed." 7 In fact, the Model Rules
abandoned both. The Jones Committee refrained from recom-
mending any changes in the section, suggesting instead that the mat-
ter be given thorough examination by an expert, such as the
Committee on Prepaid Legal Services. The latter committee submit-
ted to the House of Delegates a proposal to delete DR 2-103(D)(4)(a),
which distinguished between profit and non-profit plans."' This pro-
117. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Responsibility (of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York), A Proposal to Liberalize the Provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility Governing Prepaid Legal Service Plans, 43 THE RECORD 698 (1988)




posal was adopted; thus, paragraphs (b) through (g) have been renum-
bered." 9 The Committee on Prepaid Legal Services apparently
believed that the Bar's long-standing opposition to closed-panel plans
made the open-panel/closed-panel issue too controversial and it did
not recommend authorizing closed-panel plans.120 The text of former
DR 2-103(D)(e), therefore, remains unchanged.
5. Legal Fees
The subject of legal fees has produced substantial controversy be-
cause it has such immediate consequences to the pocketbooks of most
lawyers. The 1970 Code prohibited clearly excessive fees. This stan-
dard had been criticized for allowing fees that are unreasonably high.
For example, a 1968 opinion of the ABA Ethics Committee com-
mented that it was not concerned with the amount of fees "unless so
excessive as to constitute a misappropriation of the client's funds."' 2 1
For this reason, the ABA decided to adopt a requirement in the
Model Rules that legal fees be "reasonable."' 2 The Jones Committee
did not follow suit; it merely recommended deletion of the word
"clearly." Because the definition of an excessive fee and the factors
for determining such a fee in DR 2-106(B) remain almost unchanged,
the practical effect of the deletion of "clearly" should be negligible.
Moreover, because an "excessive" fee is defined in terms of what is in
excess of a reasonable fee, and because the factors listed in DR 2-106
are almost identical to those listed in Model Rule 1.5,)23 there should
be little difference in the determination of what is an unethical fee
under either the 1990 Code or the Model Rules.
Only one change in the factors for determining an excessive fee has
been made. DR 2-106(B)(2) formerly permitted a lawyer to increase a
fee where acceptance of the particular employment was likely to pre-
clude the lawyer from accepting other employment where such a like-
lihood was "apparent" to the client. Because what is apparent to the
client may depend upon the client's sophistication in the use of law-
yers, the amended rule provides that the likelihood of preclusion also
may be taken into consideration if it is "made known" to the client.
119. Compare 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-103(D)(4) with 1990 CODE, supra note
1, DR 2-103(D)(4).
120. See Prepaid Legal Service Plans, supra note 117. Some Kane Committee members
criticized that the 1970 Code authorized only open-panel legal service plans, but that
Committee did not recommend any changes to DR 2-103(D).
121. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 320 (1968).
122. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.5.
123. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.5 with 1990 CODE, supra note 1,
DR 2-106.
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6. Contingent Fees
In the 1970 Code, DR 2-106(C) prohibited a lawyer from charging
a contingent fee in a criminal case. EC 2-20 also warned against
charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter. Both ethics
committees and courts, however, have treated the Ethical Considera-
tion as binding.'24 The 1990 Code codifies these positions and prohib-
its a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter that involves
securing a divorce or determining the amount of maintenance, sup-
port, equitable distribution or property settlement.125 EC 2-20 had
posed problems because married women often lack the funds to hire a
lawyer and, thus, could benefit from the use of a contingent fee sys-
tem. New DR 2-106(C)(2), however, was not opposed in the House
of Delegates.
New DR 2-106(D) requires that a contingent fee be described to the
client in writing promptly after the employment of the lawyer. The
fee agreement must explain how the fee is to be determined in the case
of settlement, trial or appeal, and how litigation and other expenses
are to be treated. The provision also requires that, at the conclusion
of the matter, the lawyer provide the client with a written statement
of the outcome, and, if there is a recovery, a statement of the amount
of money being remitted to the client with an explanation of how the
amount was determined. This provision, derived from Model Rule
1.5,126 is designed to reduce client misunderstandings with respect to
contingent fees.
124. The New York courts traditionally have held that a contract providing for a con-
tingency fee dependent upon procuring a divorce or on the amount of alimony obtained is
void as against public policy. See Van Vleck v. Van Vleck, 21 A.D. 272, 47 N.Y.S. 470
(4th Dep't 1897) (percentage of support in separation action); Levine v. Levine, 206 Misc.
884, 135 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1954) (percentage of alimony or lump
sum in lieu of future alimony); Dougherty v. Burger, 133 Misc. 807, 234 N.Y.S. 274 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1929) (percentage of lump sum in divorce action); In re Dangler, 192
A.D. 237, 182 N.Y.S. 471 (1st Dep't 1920) (percentage of lump sum or alimony in sepa-
ration action); In re Brackett, 114 A.D. 257, 99 N.Y.S. 802 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 189 N.Y.
502, 81 N.E. 1160 (1906) (percentage of total settlement, including support, maintenance
and other matters in separation action). See also N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Op. 660 (1984); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on
Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 35 (1981); NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 443 (1976). This rule would not apply to cases such as a suit for the collection of
overdue alimony. See, e.g., NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 443 (1976);
NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 390 (1975); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n,
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 533 (1964); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 275 (1929).
125. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-106(c)(2).
126. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.5. See OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12,




The 1970 Code permitted a division of fees between lawyers not
associated with the same firm only where the division was in propor-
tion to the services performed by each lawyer. 127 This rule disadvan-
taged lawyers in small firms.1 28 Lawyers in large firms could refer
matters to their partners and receive a share of the fees. Lawyers in
small firms, however, were prohibited under the traditional fee-split-
ting rule from forwarding a matter outside their expertise to a more
qualified attorney and from participating in the fee. Consequently,
lawyers associated with smaller firms may have had less incentive to
refer matters to the most appropriate counsel. The amendment to
DR 2-107(A), like Model Rule 1.5(e)(1),129 allows the payment of for-
warding fees where the client consents after full disclosure that a divi-
sion of fees will be made, the division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or, by a writing given to the client, each
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation, and the to-
tal fee is reasonable.
The new rule has been criticized. During the debate in a meeting of
the State Bar House of Delegates, the representatives of the New
York City Bar Association offered three objections to the proposal . 30
First, the New York City Bar argued that client consent might not be
meaningful if the client were unsophisticated. Nonetheless, the House
of Delegates apparently agreed with the Jones Committee that most
clients are sophisticated regarding the payment of legal fees, and that
requiring the total fee to be reasonable provides adequate client pro-
tection. The State Bar also feared that courts would be reluctant to
impose liability on a referring lawyer who did not engage in affirma-
tive wrongdoing. The House of Delegates, however, apparently
agreed with the Jones Committee that, while referring lawyers may
not be held liable for every mistake in the representation, they should
be held liable for failure to supervise adequately. Finally, the New
York City Bar contended that allowing forwarding fees would en-
127. 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-107.
128. See COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (OF THE ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK), PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ABA
PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (JANUARY 30, 1980 DRAFT) 13
(July 1980).
129. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.5(e)(1).
130. See letter from Robert Kaufman, President of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York to the New York State Bar Association (December 24, 1986); Pro-
posed Amendments to Revised Draft, prepared by the Special State Bar Committee, of
the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility submitted to the House of Delegates by
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (April 6, 1987).
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courage sending cases, not to the best lawyer, but to the lawyer with
the best fee-splitting arrangement. Because the referring lawyer
would remain responsible for supervising the work of the receiving
lawyer, however, a strong incentive to send the case to the best lawyer
exists. The Jones Committee, the House of Delegates and the Appel-
late Divisions apparently believed that the potential benefits of the
amendment outweighed any possible harms.
8 Pro Bono Service
The State Bar has debated extensively the merits of mandatory ver-
sus voluntary work in the public interest. When the Halpern Com-
mittee Report was discussed at the June, 1985 House of Delegates
meeting, the House approved an amendment to Model Rule 1.6'13
that had been proposed by the Committee on Public Interest Law
regarding pro bono work. 3 2 The rule, adopted as a black letter rule,
was phrased in precatory terms. 33 The New York State Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Public Interest Law proposed to the Jones Com-
mittee that the language concerning pro bono work contained in
Model Rule 1.6 be included in the 1990 Code. In view of the preca-
tory nature of Model Rule 1.6, the Jones Committee recommended
that it replace EC 2-25; both the House of Delegates and the Appel-
late Divisions approved this change.
The revised Ethical Consideration provides that each lawyer has an
obligation to render public interest and pro bono legal service. This
obligation may be fulfilled by providing professional services at no fee
or a reduced fee to individuals of limited financial means, or to public
service or charitable organizations or programs designed to increase
the availability of legal services. Unlike Model Rule 1.6,134 the obliga-
tion imposed by EC 2-25 may not be satisfied by service in activities
for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession, or by
exclusive financial support for legal services organizations. EC 2-25
encourages financial contributions in addition to the "obligation" to
provide free or reduced-cost legal services to the poor.
9. Representation of Unpopular Clients
Both the 1990 Code and the Model Rules contain provisions that
131. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6.
132. See letter from Helaine Barnett, chair, Committee on Public Interest Law, to
Hon. Hugh R. Jones, chair, New York State Bar Association Committee to Review the
Code of Professional Responsibility (January 16, 1987).
133. Id.
134. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6.
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resemble neither rules nor aspirational principles. New EC 2-27,
which contains the substance of Model Rule 1.2(b), 135 is illustrative.
EC 2-27 states that a lawyer's representation of a client does not con-
stitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities. Though EC 2-27 falls short of encouraging
lawyers to represent unpopular clients, it is helpful to those lawyers
who undertake such representation.
10. Withdrawal from Representation
The 1970 Code allowed permissive withdrawal only where permit-
ted by DR 2-110(C). Although the listed causes for withdrawal were
fairly broad, they presented some problems. For example, the catch-
all phrase of DR 2-1 10(C)(6), which provided that a lawyer may with-
draw where, in a proceeding before a tribunal, the lawyer believes the
tribunal will find good cause for withdrawal, applied only in a litiga-
tion context. The first amendment to DR 2-110(C) resolves that
problem by allowing withdrawal for any reason as long as withdrawal
can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests
of the client. This amendment is similar to Model Rule 1.16(b).136
Another change adopted by both the ABA and the State Bar is that
the lawyer may withdraw where a justification for withdrawal exists,
even if the withdrawal would have a material adverse effect on the
interests of the client. 137 Under DR 2-1 10(A)(2) as amended, the law-
yer would have to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights, including giving due
notice and allowing time for the client to employ other counsel. The
Jones Committee supported this amendment because it believed that
under the 1970 Code, clients could place the lawyer in a position
where withdrawal was desirable but prohibited because of the possible
prejudice to the client. The Committee maintained that the specified
justifications for withdrawal were serious enough to strike a proper
balance between the rights of lawyers and clients. 3 The House of
Delegates rejected a proposal by the Jones Committee to add to the
list the situation where representation would result in an unreasonable
financial burden on the lawyer, even though that ground for with-
drawal appears in Model Rule 1.16(b)(6). 39
135. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(b).
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16(b).
137. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-110(C).
138. See supra note 10.
139. Compare FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 41 with OCTOBER 1987
DRAFT, supra note 12, at 38-41; MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16(b)(6).
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The one addition to the list of reasons for permissive withdrawal is
DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(g), authorizing withdrawal where the client has used
the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud. This addition,
which also appears in Model Rule 1.16(b)(2),'" may be referred to as
the OPM exception. In In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.,14 the
client admitted that it had used the firm's services to close several
fraudulent lease financing transactions. The client, however, repre-
sented to the firm that all fraudulent conduct occurred in the past,
and that all current transactions were completely honest. Thus, the
law firm concluded that the 1970 Code provided no grounds for with-
drawal.1 42 DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(g) allows a lawyer to withdraw on the
ground that the lawyer's services have been used to commit a past
crime or fraud, even where the lawyer has no reason to believe that
any present or future criminal activity is likely.
E. Canon 4 - Preserving the Client's Confidences 143
Given the lengthy and often bitter debate concerning the subject of
confidentiality in connection with the ABA's adoption of the Model
Rules, it may be surprising to some that New York has effected only
minor changes in Canons 4 and 7.'" It seems likely, however, that
the vehemence of the New York State Bar Association's opposition to
Model Rules 1.6 and 3.3 145 stemmed from the belief that the 1970
Code, as previously interpreted, struck a fair balance between the in-
terests of the public and the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship.
There has been only one change to the Disciplinary Rules concern-
ing disclosure of client confidences and secrets. A new DR 4-
10l(C)(5) incorporates language from one of the comments to Model
Rule 1.6.146 DR 4-101 (C)(5) allows a lawyer to reveal confidences or
secrets to the extent implicit in withdrawing a previously rendered
written or oral opinion when the lawyer discovers that the opinion is
based on materially inaccurate information or is being used in the
furtherance of criminal or fraudulent conduct and where the lawyer
believes a third person is still relying on the opinion or representation.
140. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.16(b)(2).
141. 13 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
142. See Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, January 9, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 31.
143. The only amendments to Canon 3 were changes to effect gender-neutrality.
144. For a discussion of the changes to Canon 7, see infra notes 192-215 and accompa-
nying text. Only the changes to Canon 4 are discussed in this section.
145. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 1.6, 3.3.
146. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.6.
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Although some debate existed over whether the 1970 Code allowed a
lawyer to withdraw his or her opinion, even though failure to do so
might be deemed aiding and abetting a fraud on the part of the client,
the prevailing view would have permitted withdrawal of the opinion
without further explanation. 47 This "withdrawal-without-comment"
solution also has been approved where the lawyer believes the client
intends to commit perjury.148
The second change in Canon 4 is a new EC 4-7, which provides
lawyers with guidelines to determine when to reveal confidential cli-
ent information under DR 4-101(C) and sets forth an admonition to
grievance committees and courts that the lawyer's decision regarding
disclosure should not subject the lawyer to discipline. The lawyer's
discretion to disclose future crimes is very broad; it is not limited to
serious crimes, but covers -any crime. Ethical Consideration 4-7,
which codifies concepts set forth in a 1984 opinion of the State Bar's
Ethics Committee, 14 9 suggests that the lawyer consider such factors as
the seriousness of the potential injury to others if the prospective
crime is committed, the likelihood that the crime will be committed
and the crime's imminence, the apparent absence of any other feasible
way in which the potential injury can be prevented, the extent to
which the client may have attempted to involve the lawyer in the pro-
spective crime, the circumstances under which the lawyer acquired
the information and any aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
F. Canon 5 - Conflicts of Interest
1. Payment of Court Costs
Traditional notions of champerty and maintenance prohibit a law-
yer from agreeing to pay the costs incurred in litigation. Moreover,
paying such costs is deemed to give a lawyer financial interest in the
outcome of the litigation that may affect the lawyer's independent
judgment. Accordingly, under both EC 5-8 and DR 5-103(B)(2) of
the 1970 Code, a lawyer was prohibited from advancing such costs
unless the client remained ultimately liable for their payment. This
provision proved worrisome to lawyers engaged in pro bono work for
147. See Sonde, Continuing Debate on Attorneys' Responsibilities to the Public and
Third Parties, 36 Bus. LAW. 585 (1981); ABA Proceedings of Corporate Law Department
Forum, Panel Discussion, 36 Bus. LAW. 597 (1981).
148. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953)
(if the court asks the lawyer to confirm an untruthful statement of the client, the lawyer
should ask to withdraw, although this would doubtless cause the court to inquire further
as to the truth).
149. NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 562 (1984).
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indigent clients whose means were insufficient to guaranty the pay-
ment of court costs. Several ethics opinions held that, where law does
not prohibit the practice, a lawyer ethically may pay court and other
litigation costs for indigent clients.15 The amendments to EC 5-8 and
DR 5-103(B)(2) codify those opinions by providing that a lawyer rep-
resenting an indigent client on a pro bono basis may pay court costs
and reasonable litigation expenses on behalf of the client unless such
payment is prohibited by law or by court rules.
2. Literary or Media Rights
It is not uncommon for lawyers to buy from their clients the publi-
cation or television/movie rights to their stories.151 Indeed, this may
be one way for clients to finance their cases. Ownership of such
rights, however, may raise conflicting interests. The lawyer's desire
for a sensational story may compromise his or her ability to attain the
most advantageous disposition for the client. EC 5-4 and DR 5-
104(B) formerly prohibit the lawyer from negotiating an interest in
the publication rights to the subject matter of the representation prior
to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the repre-
sentation. Although EC 5-4 referred to television, radio and motion
picture rights as well as newspaper, magazine and book rights, the
Jones Committee, like the drafters of Model Rule 1.8(d), 5 2 broadened
the terminology from "publication" rights to "literary or media"
rights to incorporate new forms of transmitting information.15
3. The Lawyer as Witness
The rules of the profession long have provided that a lawyer who
may be called as a witness for the client, other than to testify as to
formalistic or uncontested issues, should not try the case.154 The 1970
Code also provided that none of the lawyer's partners or associates
150. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1361 (1976).
151. See Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1982). The resulting story, however, may effect a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987).
152. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.8(d).
153. See OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 54.
154. See, e.g., American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 19, 33
ABA REPORTS 85 (1908).
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters,
such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave
the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends ofjustice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court on behalf of his client.
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could undertake the representation. 55 Under several amendments to
the 1970 Code, only the lawyer-witness and not his or her partners
and associates will be disqualified.
EC 5-9 identifies four reasons for disqualifying the lawyer-witness:
(1) the lawyer-witness is more easily impeachable for interest and,
thus, may be a less effective witness; (2) opposing counsel may be
handicapped in challenging the credibility of the lawyer-witness; (3) it
is unseemly, and may be ineffective, for a lawyer-witness to argue his
or her own credibility; and (4) the roles of advocate and witness are
inconsistent, for the advocate's function is to introduce the client's
case in its best light, while the obligation of the witness is to state the
facts of the case objectively. For these reasons, DR 5-101(B) prohib-
ited the acceptance of employment where it was obvious that the law-
yer ought to be called as a witness. Moreover, DR 5-102(A) required
withdrawal when, after accepting representation, the lawyer learned
that he or she ought to be called as a witness for the client.
The rationales of former DR 5-101(B) and DR 5-102(A) are weak
when applied to the affected lawyer,1 56 and even weaker when applied
to the entire firm.157 The disqualification of the entire firm has been
criticized as having an unnecessarily harsh effect on clients, because it
forces clients to hire new counsel to represent them at trial.15 8  For
these reasons, the 1990 Code, like Model Rule 3.7(b),1 59 does not dis-
qualify the entire firm when one lawyer may be called as a witness.
The amendments to DR 5-101(B) and DR 5-102 specify that the
affected lawyer may not act as an advocate in any such proceeding,
and thus clarifies that the lawyer may continue to work on the mat-
ter.160 In addition, the disqualification of the other lawyers in the firm
155. See 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-102(A).
156. For example, the regular counsel for a client will be impeachable for interest
whether or not the lawyer serves as an advocate in the matter in which he or she will
testify. Moreover, matters of credibility should certainly not apply in a non-jury trial.
On the theory that the rule was designed to protect the client rather than the opposing
lawyer, California amended its code to allow a lawyer to serve as both advocate and
witness where the client consents in writing after full disclosure. CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 2-11 l(A)(4) (1975).
157. See People ex. rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 180, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (1978) (court refuses to apply vicarious disqualification to prosecutor's office,
and states that most of EC 5-9's reasons for not allowing a lawyer to be both advocate
and witness do not apply when the witness's law firm acts as counsel); Plotkin v. Interco
Development Corp., 137 A.D.2d 671, 524 N.Y.S.2d 763 (2d Dep't 1988).
158. See generally Note, The Testifying Advocate- Witness Rule: If Z then X. But
Why?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1365 (1977).
159. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 3.7(b).
160. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 89-
1529 (1989) (reaching the same conclusion under the Model Rules).
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has been eliminated from these rules, as well as from the vicarious
disqualification provisions of DR 5-105(D), unless the lawyer-witness
will be called by the adversary to give testimony that may prejudice
the client.
4. Vicarious Disqualification
Under the rule of vicarious disqualification contained in DR 5-
105(D) of the 1970 Code, where one lawyer in a firm is required to
decline or withdraw from representation under DR 5-105, governing
the conflicts of interest between two clients, no other lawyer in the
firm may continue the representation. When the ABA amended its
version of DR 5-105(D) to apply vicarious disqualification to all disci-
plinary rules, not just DR 5-105,161 New York did not follow suit.
Nevertheless, the State Bar Association Ethics Committee opined that
the rule in New York should be interpreted as if the amendment had
been adopted.1 62
Such a broad interpretation hardly makes sense. For example,
where a lawyer is required to decline representation because he or she
is not competent to handle the matter, another lawyer in the firm
should not be barred from continuing representation. Similarly,
where a lawyer is obligated to withdraw under DR 2-1 10(B)(3) be-
cause of a mental or physical condition, or under DR 2-1 10(B)(2) and
DR 7-101(A) because dislike of the client makes the lawyer incapable
of representing the client with zeal, there is no reason why another
lawyer in the firm should be disqualified from handling the case.
Consequently, the amendment to DR 5-105(D) limits vicarious dis-
qualification to the conflict of interest situations set forth in DR 5-
101(A) (financial, business or personal interests), DR 5-105(A), (B)
and (C) (representation of differing interests), DR 5-108 (undertaking
a representation adverse to a former client on a matter substantially
related to the former representation) and DR 9-101(B) (representa-
tion of a private client in a matter which a former government lawyer
was personally and substantially involved). 163
The amendment is not without anomaly. For example, if one law-
yer in the firm is unable to represent a client because of personal be-
liefs, another lawyer in the firm arguably should not be prohibited
161. MODEL CODE, supra note 2, DR 5-105.
162. NYSBA Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 502 (1979)
163. In the case of the former government lawyer, the firm is not vicariously disquali-
fied if the former government lawyer is effectively screened from participation in the mat-




from undertaking the representation. The Jones Committee, how-
ever, did not believe it was possible to draft DR 5-105(D) to accom-
modate such fine distinctions under DR 5-101(A). 1"
New DR 5-105(D) reflects a drafting change made by the Jones
Committee to correct what it deemed to be an unintended effect of
poor drafting. The original version of DR 5-105(D) provided that
where one lawyer was required to decline representation, no other
lawyer in the firm was permitted to continue it. The effect of the pro-
vision could be avoided where the client first went to a lawyer who
was not required to decline the representation. The new provision
clarifies that vicarious disqualification applies regardless of whether
the lawyer with the primary disqualification is approached for
representation.
5. Conflicts with Former Clients
The Original Code became effective long after Judge Weinfeld first
articulated the "substantially related" test to distinguish between con-
flicts of interest between concurrent and successive representations. 165
Nevertheless, both the Original Code and the 1970 Code have failed
to set forth this important distinction to aid lawyers in analyzing con-
flicts problems. To remedy this situation, new DR 5-108(A), like
Model Rule 1.9,166 prohibits a lawyer who has represented Client A
from thereafter representing Client B in the same or a substantially
related matter in which Client B's interests are materially adverse to
those of Client A, without obtaining the consent of Client A. In addi-
tion, the new rule emphasizes that a lawyer may not use confidences
or secrets of Client A in the subsequent matter except when permitted
under DR 4-101(C) or when the information has become generally
known. This latter exception departs from EC 4-4, which provides
that information is protected as a "secret" despite "the fact that
others share the knowledge," but remains consistent with the attor-
ney-client privilege, which does not apply when the information be-
comes publicly known. This departure from Canon 4 is justified in
the context of DR 5-108, because a former client should not preclude
a lawyer from representing another client when the lawyer cannot de-
rive any advantage from the prior representation.
164. See FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFr, supra note 43, at 66 and accompanying Source
Notes.
165. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
166. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.9.
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6. Lateral Movement Between Firms
The House of Delegates rejected a recommendation of the Jones
Committee to add provisions concerning lateral movement of lawyers
between law firms.1 67 Thus, the law in New York State regarding
lateral movement between law firms remains the same as it was before
the adoption of the 1990 Code amendments.
The Jones Committee proposed two additions to the 1970 Code to
be denominated as DR 5-108(B) and (C). 68 The first provided that
when a lawyer, or the firm where he or she practiced, had represented
Client A, and the lawyer then became associated with a new firm, the
new firm was barred from representing Client B in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter where the interests of Client B were materi-
ally adverse to the interests of Client A. This rule merely codified the
existing law on "concurrent representation" and would not have cre-
ated any controversy had the House of Delegates been asked to vote
on it alone.
The vote on this proposed addition, however, was coupled with a
vote on a far more controversial proposal, DR 5-108(C).' 69 This pro-
vision allowed the new firm to represent Client B if three conditions
were met: (1) the transferring lawyer did not participate personally or
substantially in the representation at the prior firm; (2) the transfer-
ring lawyer learned no confidences or secrets of Client A; and (3) the
transferring lawyer was effectively screened from any participation in
the new representation and was apportioned no part of the fee from
Client B. This proposal was criticized by both liberals and conserva-
tives.' 70 Liberals argued that, under current New York State and Sec-
ond Circuit case law, the lawyer must have had access to Client A's
confidences and secrets before being disqualified. Accordingly, liber-
als contended that disqualification should apply only where the law-
yer, not merely the former firm, represented Client A or had access to
Client A's confidences or secrets. 171 Where no such access existed,
167. Compare FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 68-69 and accompanying
Source Notes with 1990 CODE, supra note 1, Canon 5.
168. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 68-69 and accompanying Source
Notes.
169. New York State Bar Association Minutes of the House of Delegates meeting,
June 26-27, 1987.
170. See, e.g., Gillers, Amending State Ethics Code - Conflicts of Interest Gone Awry,
N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1987, at 1, col. 3 ("Young New York lawyers, and older ones who
may want to change firms, pay attention. Your job mobility is about to be sharply cur-
tailed."); Statement of Barry H. Garfinkel to New York State Bar Association in opposi-
tion to proposed DR 5-108 (April 10, 1987).
171. See Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955)
(a lawyer, formerly of Firm A, could rebut the presumption he had confidential client
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the lawyer should not be prohibited from representing Client B. Con-
servatives argued that, where the lawyer did have access to Client A's
confidential information, screening should not be permitted, except in
the case of former government lawyers, where a special public policy
toward encouraging public service applies.172 To avoid departure
from existing case law, the House of Delegates rejected the proposed
amendment. 173
7. The Organizational Client
The complex subject of the representation of organizational clients,
particularly of corporations, was addressed in the 1970 Code in four
sentences, noting that a lawyer represents the corporate entity and not
any stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative or other
person connected with the corporation.1 74 The Model Rules devoted
an entire rule, Model Rule 1.13,175 to the conflicts that may occur in
representing an organization. In particular, the rule sets forth the re-
sponsibilities of a lawyer when an individual associated with the or-
ganization violates a legal obligation to the organization or engages in
a violation of law that may be imputed to the entity and is likely to
information that would benefit the clients of his new firm, Firm B; otherwise, "young
lawyers might seriously jeopardize their careers by temporary affiliation with large law
firms"); United States v. Standard Oil Company, 136 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
("[I]t is doubtful if the Canons of Ethics are intended to disqualify an attorney who did
not actually come into contact with materials substantially related to the controversy at
hand when he was acting as attorney for a former client now adverse to his position.");
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1975) ("cases and the Canons on which they are based are intended to protect the confi-
dences of former clients when an attorney has been in a position to learn them"); USFL
v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court recognizes in dicta that the
presumption that each lawyer in a firm is privy to confidences is a rebuttable one); Greene
v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 453, 418 N.Y.S.2d 379, 382 (1979) ("reasonable probability of
disclosure" of confidences required for disqualification); Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc.,
99 A.D.2d 507, 507, 470 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (2d Dep't 1984) (although attorney associ-
ated with plaintiff's counsel was privy to confidential information about defendants, ap-
pearance of impropriety created by such conduct was "too slender a reed on which to rest
a disqualification order").
172. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. of Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Op. 889 (1976). The exception that proves the rule is NFC Inc. v. General Nutrition,
Inc., 562 F. Supp. 332, 334-35 (D. Mass. 1983), where the court approved screening. See
also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981) (Supreme
Court recognizes that measures short of disqualification are available, including a protec-
tive order limiting counsel's ability to disclose or to act on purportedly confidential
information).
173. See generally OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 69-70.
174. See 1970 CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-18.
175. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.3.
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result in substantial injury to the entity.176
Because many of the guidelines set forth in Model Rule 1.13 are
suggestions of permitted conduct, the Jones Committee recommended
that a version of those guidelines be added to EC 5-18.'17 The amend-
ment proposed that the lawyer proceed in the best interest of the en-
tity, taking into account such factors as the seriousness of the
violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the entity and the
apparent motivation of the person involved in the conduct, and the
policies of the entity concerning such matters.' 7 This formulation
allows the matter to be pursued through the corporate hierarchy or
"chain of command," rather than by the board of directors.179
New DR 5-109, also derived from Model Rule 1.13, encompasses
the classic conflict of interest that occurs when the interests of the
corporation diverge from the interests of an officer, director, employee
or shareholder with whom the lawyer is dealing. Such conflicts may
occur, for example, when both the organization and directors, officers
or employees are accused of wrongdoing or when the organization or
its lawyers conduct an investigation of possible wrongdoing by corpo-
rate officers. The new rule requires the lawyer to explain to the indi-
viduals that he or she represents only the organization.
8. Membership in a Legal Services Organization
The final new conflicts provision, DR 5-110, addresses the situation
where a lawyer is a member of a legal services organization whose
clients may have interests different than those of a private client of the
lawyer or his or her firm. A 1978 opinion of the New York State Bar
Association Ethics Committee'80 held that, where a lawyer served as a
member of the board of a legal services organization, neither the
Board member nor others in his or her firm could represent clients
with interests adverse to those of a client of the organization.' 8 ' This
opinion was consistent with an informal ABA opinion issued the pre-
vious year.'8 2 In a 1979 formal opinion,8 3 however, the ABA Ethics
Committee reversed itself, holding that the board member of a legal
services organization and his or her firm may undertake the adverse
176. Id.
177. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 58-59.
178. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-18.
179. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (1981).
180. NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 489 (1978).
181. Id.
182. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1395
(1977).
183. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 345 (1979).
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representation as long as the organization's legal staff is insulated
from influence by the board and lawyers for both sides believe that
neither client would be deprived of independent representation."8 4
New York did not reconsider its opinion. Nonetheless, the Jones
Committee concluded that the ABA was correct."1 5
Because the board member of a legal services organization does not
represent the clients of the organization, the ethical, issue posed is ac-
tually an appearance of impropriety under Canon 9 rather than a con-
flict in representation .under Canon 5.186 Even so, the Jones
Committee addressed the issue in Canon 5.1 New DR 5-110 allows
the lawyer to serve a legal services organization even if the organiza-
tion's clients have interests contrary to those of a client of the lawyer-
board member, as long as the lawyer-board member does not know-
ingly participate in any decision of the organization where such par-
ticipation would be incompatible with the lawyer's duty of loyalty to a
client or the decision could have a material adverse effect on the rep-
resentation of a client of the organization.
G. Canon 6 - Competent Representation
1. Responding to Client Inquiries
One of the most frequent complaints by clients about lawyers is
that lawyers do not return client phone calls or respond promptly to
inquiries regarding the status of pending legal matters. The Jones
Committee thought it desirable that the 1990'Code stress the impor-
tance of responding promptly to client inquiries.'88 In recognition
that lawyers require adequate allowance to respond to clients as ap-
propriate, the provision was added as an Ethical Consideration, EC 6-
4, rather than as a Disciplinary Rule.'89
2. Limiting Lawyer's Liability to Client
The 1970 Code prohibited a lawyer from seeking to limit his or her
individual liability to the client for malpractice. As EC 6-6 stated:
184. Id.
185. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 70.
186. Indeed, the ABA chose to make membership in legal services organizations the
subject of Model Rule 6.3, rather than part of the conflicts sections, although Model Rule
6.3 depends upon compliance with the general conflict rule - Model Rule 1.7. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 6.3, 1.7.
187. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 69-70.
188. Id. at 72.
189. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.4 (a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information).
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"A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no need
to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one
who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not be
permitted to do so."'" In practice, this prohibition has been applied
to prospective limitation of liability, but not to settlement of malprac-
tice claims threatened or filed by the client.1 9 The amendments to
EC 6-6 and DR 6-102(A) clearly set forth the different rules in these
two situations. The lawyer may not seek to limit his or her malprac-
tice liability prospectively; however, the lawyer may settle a claim for
malpractice after advising the client that independent representation
is appropriate.
H. Canon 7 - Zealous Representation
1. Prosecution Subpoenas of Defense Attorneys
A subject that has generated great controversy in the past few
years, as well as charges of overzealousness on the part of prosecutors,
is the summoning of defense lawyers in criminal matters. The most
common reason for such subpoenas is to elicit information about the
fee arrangement in an attempt to show that the client has substantial
assets acquired through illegal activity or that the client is associated
in a criminal enterprise with another who is paying the attorney's fee.
Attorneys generally have viewed these attempts to require lawyers to
provide testimony against their clients as an intrusion upon the confi-
dential attorney-client relationship.'92 These subpoenas may have a
substantial effect on the willingness of clients to disclose confidential
information to their lawyers. Subpoenas may also provide the prose-
cution with a useful tool to disqualify defense counsel, for DR 5-
102(B) provides that a lawyer who must give testimony that may be
prejudicial to the client must withdraw as an advocate.
In response to this problem, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, at the prompting of the Massachusetts State Bar Association,
adopted a new disciplinary rule, Prosecution Function 15,193 which
makes it unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to issue to a lawyer
a grand jury subpoena seeking testimony about a client of such lawyer
190. 1970 CODE, supra note 1, EC 6-6.
191. See NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 591 (1988) ("A lawyer may ethi-
cally negotiate with a former client for the settlement or release of potential malpractice
claims, but only after the lawyer takes specific steps to insure that the negotiations are
fair.").
192. See, e.g., Rudolph and Maher, The Attorney Subpoena: You are Hereby Com-
manded to Betray Your Client, 1 CRIM. JUSTICE 15 (1986).
193. MASS. S.J.C. Rule 3:08, PF 15.
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without prior judicial approval. This rule was upheld against a chal-
lenge under the Supremacy Clause.'9 4 Indeed, the First Circuit de-
clared the disciplinary rule to be a "limited, reasonable response to
what appears to be a mounting professional problem."195
The Second Circuit has proved less sympathetic to the plight of
criminal defendants and their lawyers. In an en banc decision,196 the
Second Circuit unanimously held that the government was not re-
quired to make a showing of need before issuing a subpoena to the
defendant's lawyer. The court also rejected, at least in a pre-indict-
ment context, the argument that testimony by the lawyer would dis-
qualify the lawyer from further representation of the client: "Before
disqualification can even be contemplated, the attorney's testimony
must incriminate his client; the grand jury must indict; the govern-
ment must go forward with the prosecution of the indictment; and
ultimately, the attorney must be advised that he will be called as a
trial witness against his client."1 97 In light of the opposition to requir-
ing prosecutors to obtain prior judicial approval of subpoenas of law-
yers, the Jones Committee declined to recommend adoption of any
amendment to the 1970 Code that would require such prior judicial
approval. Nevertheless, the sentiment against attorney subpoenas in
the House of Delegates was so strong that the House approved
amendments to EC 7-14 and DR 7-103(C).19s
The first sentence of DR 7-103(C) adopted by the House of Dele-
gates was benign; it provides that a prosecutor or other government
lawyer may not seek to compel testimony other than by lawful means,
and must comply with all applicable court rules relating to subpoenas.
The second sentence, however, was controversial for two reasons: 199
it applied to all government lawyers, not just public prosecutors, and
it required prior judicial approval for a subpoena of a lawyer seeking
information about a past or present client and required that the appli-
cation for the subpoena be on notice to the lawyer and the client.2"°
As a result of the second sentence, the New York standard would
194. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 664
(1st Cir. 1987).
195. 832 F.2d at 657.
196. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq., 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.
1985).
197. Id. at 245. The standard is actually whether the lawyer "[in]ay be called as a
witness .. " MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 5-102(B).
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have surpassed the disciplinary rule adopted in Massachusetts. 2 '
The Appellate Divisions agreed with the Jones Committee. In view
of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq.,202 they
determined not to accept either sentence of the proposed Disciplinary
Rule.203 Accordingly, if the State Bar wishes to attack the right of
prosecutors to subpoena non-privileged information from lawyers, it
will have to seek changes in the rules of criminal and grand jury
procedure.
It is interesting to note that the American Bar Association, at
its February, 1990 meeting, approved a new Model Rule, 3.8(f), 2°
which requires prior judicial approval of, and an opportunity for, an
adversarial proceeding with respect to a subpoena requiring a lawyer
to appear before a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to provide
evidence about a past or present client. The rule also requires that the
information sought from the lawyer be essential to the successful
completion of an ongoing investigation and that no other feasible al-
ternative to obtaining it exists.205 Whether the rule will be adopted by
the individual Model Rules states remains to be seen.
2 Citing Controlling Authority
The original DR 7-106(B)(1) required a lawyer to disclose legal au-
thority "in the controlling jurisdiction" if it was directly adverse to
the position of his or her client and opposing counsel had not dis-
closed it. As EC 7-23 explains, a tribunal that is fully informed on the
applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination
of the matter before it. Unfortunately, the Ethical Consideration fails
to explain what is meant by "controlling jurisdiction." An opinion of
the New York City Bar explained that the lawyer's obligation is to
disclose controlling precedent.2e6 For example, in the federal courts
an attorney must disclose opinions of the United States Supreme
Court and the court of appeals of the circuit in which the tribunal is
located. 20 7 An amendment to DR 7-106(B)(1) adopts this position
and requires a lawyer to disclose "controlling legal authority."
201. The Massachusetts rule is limited to present clients and does not require notice to
the clients. MASS. S.J.C. Rule 3:08, PF 15.
202. 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985).
203. Compare OCTOBER 1987 DRAFr, supra note 12, at 92-93 with 1990 CODE, supra
note 1, DR 7-103(C).
204. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 3.8(f).
205. Id.
206. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. of Professional and Judicial Ethics,




Trial publicity has been a subject of intense debate during the past
several years. The Federal Bar Counsel has called for an easing of
restrictions on statements to the media by criminal defense lawyers
because the rules are perceived to give prosecutors an unfair advan-
tage.2 °8 Surprisingly, the controversy surrounding the Jones Commit-
tee's recommended changes to the 1970 Code stemmed not from
its general rules concerning statements to the press, but rather from a
relatively small change to the "safe harbor" list of permitted
statements.
New DR 7-107, as originally proposed by the Jones Committee,2c 9
mirrored Model Rule 3.6.210 The amended DR 7-107 varies signifi-
cantly from DR 7-107 in the 1970 Code, which had been held uncon-
stitutional by several courts.211 The individual paragraphs of the old
rule covered different stages of various legal proceedings, with a list of
statements that could or could not be made. Generally, if a statement
did not fall within a safe harbor, it was prohibited. This scheme was
held unconstitutional because it did not require a showing that a par-
ticular prohibited statement actually threatened the fair administra-
tion of justice. 212
The Jones Committee proposal, like Model Rule 3.6, contained the
general rule that a lawyer may not make an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated if he or she
knows, or reasonably should know, that it will have a substantial like-
lihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 213 DR 7-
107(B) then set forth statements ordinarily considered prejudicial and
DR 7-107(C) set forth a safe harbor listing statements that are not
deemed prejudicial.
The Committee received complaints from press groups because it
omitted four statements on the safe harbor list in the 1970 Code: dis-
208. See, e.g., Wise, Lawyer's Press Remarks - Misconduct or Free Speech?, N.Y.L.J.,
May 29, 1987, at 1, col. 4; Wise, Bar Council Would Ease Rule on Lawyer's Press State-
ments, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1987, at 1, col. 4. The rule that produced the complaint of the
Federal Bar Council was Local Rule 7(a) of the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
York. E.D.N.Y. R.7(a); S.D.N.Y. R.7(a). This rule, however, is identical to DR 7-107 in
the 1970 Code.
209. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 58.
210. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 3.6.
211. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Law-
yers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Markfield
v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 49 A.D.2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1st
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 794, 337 N.E.2d 612, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1975).
212. Id.
213. FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 101-02.
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closures about resistance, pursuit, use of weapons and physical evi-
dence seized.21 4 The Committee agreed with the comment in the
Code Comparison section of the Model Rules that it is impossible to
say that these four disclosures can never be prejudicial. 21 5 Revela-
tions about these factors may be substantially prejudicial and are fre-
quently the subject of pre-trial suppression motions.
In a compromise, the House of Delegates restored the four disclo-
sures to DR 7-107(C), so that they would be treated the same as the
other disclosures referred to in that paragraph. The House of Dele-
gates also made the entire paragraph subject to the "likelihood of ma-
terially prejudicing the proceeding" test in paragraph (A). Thus, in
effect, paragraph (C) is no longer a safe harbor. The lawyer must
always exercise discretion before making a disclosure, weighing the
need for immediate disclosure against the likelihood of potential prej-
udice. While the existence of the list in DR 7-107(C) indicates that
those disclosures ordinarily are not prejudicial, the lawyer still must
exercise his or her judgment in every case.
I. Canon 8 - Improving the Legal System
Many lawyers are members of organizations that seek law reform.
Occasionally, a lawyer's personal interest in law reform may conflict
with a client's economic interest. Those conflicts are addressed by
DR 5-101. The Jones Committee spoke to a reverse side of the prob-
lem in an amended EC 8-4, derived from the comment to Model Rule
6.4.216 After admonishing lawyers to be mindful of the conflicts pro-
visions in DR 5-101 through 5-110, the Ethical Consideration states
that, "[a] lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of
the organization by making an appropriate disclosure within the or-
ganization when the lawyer knows that a private client might be ma-
terially affected. ' '21 7 This formulation applies whether the effect on
the client was positive or negative. EC 8-4 differs from Model Rule
6.4, which requires disclosure only if the client would be materially
benefitted.
214. See letter from Jay B. Wright, Executive Director, New York Fair Trial Free
Press Conference to the Honorable Thomas M. Whalen, III, Mayor of Albany (March
25, 1989) (subsequently transmitted to the Jones Committee); Western Union Mailgram
from New York State Society of Newspaper Editors to Marjorie Gross (June 26, 1987)
(delivered at the House of Delegates meeting). Compare 1970 CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-
107 with FEBRUARY 1987 DRAFT, supra note 43, at 99-100.
215. See supra note 10.
216. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 6.4.
217. 1990 CODE, supra note 1, EC 8-4.
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J. Canon 9 - The Appearance of Impropriety
Canon 9 has drawn disfavor in the past decade. For example, the
Second Circuit has refused to base an attorney disqualification on the
appearance of impropriety alone, holding that it is "simply too slen-
der a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest
of cases. '218 The Model Rules completely abandoned the concept.
Nevertheless, the New York State Bar Association decided to retain
Canon 9219 and to add two new disciplinary rules.
1. The Revolving Door
During the 1970s, the issue of law practice by former government
lawyers was a topic of major concern. The Ethics in Government
Act,220 a variety of court cases22I and ethics opinions222 have dealt
with the ability of a former government lawyer and his or her law firm
to represent, or to continue representing, clients on whose matters the
lawyer worked while in government service. Formerly, DR 9-101(B)
prohibited a lawyer from accepting private employment in a matter in
which he or she had substantial responsibility while a public em-
ployee. Moreover, DR 5-105(D) extended the disqualification to the
entire firm. New DR 9-101(B)(1) codifies the cases and ethics opin-
ions interpreting these standards.
The new rule generally provides that, unless the law expressly au-
thorizes it, a former government lawyer may not represent a private
client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and sub-
stantially as a government employee. Other lawyers in the firm, how-
ever, may undertake the representation as long as the disqualified
lawyer is effectively screened from any participation in the matter and
is apportioned no part of the fee, and there are no other circumstances
of the representation that create an appearance of impropriety. The
latter requirement refers to the inability to screen in small firms where
it is impossible for the lawyers who undertake the representation to
218. Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d
Cir. 1979).
219. Because the Appellate Divisions adopted only the Disciplinary Rules, Canon 9
itself should not be enforceable. Nevertheless, Canon 9 was often cited in conjunction
with other sections of the 1970 Code as supporting disciplinary charges.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1978).
221. Eg., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds,
449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
222. Eg., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975).
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avoid contact with the disqualified lawyer.223
Two differences exist between new DR 9-101(B)(1) and Model Rule
1.11.224 The comment to Model Rule 1.11 explains that the language,
"apportioned no part of the fee," does not prevent the disqualified
lawyer from being paid a fixed salary, but only prevents the lawyer
from receiving a pro rata share of all income or profits of the firm.22
Moreover, the Model Rules define the term "matter" broadly for pur-
poses of determining when the former government lawyer worked on
a "matter" for the government. 226 The Jones Committee left the in-
terpretation of these terms to the courts and ethics committees.227
New DR 9-101(B)(2) prohibits a former government lawyer who
possesses information gained while in government service from repre-
senting other clients who could use that information to the material
disadvantage of any person. Thus, a lawyer who participated in the
investigation or prosecution of criminal charges against a party may
not bring a civil suit against that same party. Therefore, third parties
are protected against the use of information gained with the govern-
ment's power of subpoena.228 A law firm may continue representa-
tion, however, as long as the tainted lawyer is screened.
DR 9-101(B)(1) and (2) strike an appropriate balance between the
need of the government to recruit able attorneys from the private sec-
tor without making such attorneys unemployable following govern-
ment service and the need of private clients to be protected against
conflicts of interest.
New DR 9- 101(B)(3), like Model Rule 1.1 l(c), 229 addresses lawyers
who go from private to public employment. The new rule provides
that the lawyer may not participate in a matter in which he or she
participated personally and substantially while in private practice un-
less, under applicable law, no one else is authorized or can be dele-
gated to act in place of the tainted lawyer. This rule is sensible,
because it protects the private client in all cases unless the public
would otherwise be harmed because no one is authorized to act on its
behalf.
223. Cheng v. G.A.F. Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds,
450 U.S. 903 (1981).
224. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11.
225. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11 comment.
226. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11(d).
227. Gillers, Amending the Ethics Code - Conflicts of Interest, Screening, N.Y.L.J.,
November 12, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
228. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
229. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.1 (c).
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2. Conflicts Involving Relatives
In 1975, the New York City Bar Association deemed it necessary to
publish a formal opinion regarding whether the separate practice of
law in the same community by a husband and wife constituted a con-
flict of interest on the part of either spouse. 230 Ethics opinions gener-
ally held that the husband and wife could not represent opposing
parties and that their firms could represent opposing parties only with
the consent of both clients, on the grounds of conflict of interest, po-
tential compromise of client confidences and appearance of impropri-
ety. 231 This rationale also was held applicable to a father and his son
or daughter.232 In a 1975 opinion of the ABA Ethics Committee,233
however, the ABA held that the Model Code did not expressly pro-
hibit the acceptance of representation where a husband, wife, son,
daughter, brother, father or other close relative represents the oppos-
ing party. Rather, the ABA allowed the clients to consent to such
representation after full disclosure of the effect on the lawyers' loy-
alty, unless the interest of one of the relatives created a financial or
personal interest that reasonably might affect the ability of the related
lawyer to represent his or her client with undivided loyalty.
234
DR 9-101(D) allows two related lawyers to appear opposite each
other as long as each lawyer determines that he or she can adequately
represent the interests of the client, the lawyer discloses the relation-
ship to the client and the client consents. If either of the two lawyers
is disqualified from representation, however, the other lawyers in his
or her firm would not automatically be disqualified, since they pre-
sumably would not be subject to the same appearance of impropriety
in appearing opposite someone else's relative.
3. Handling Property of Others
The final section of the 1990 Code governs the lawyer's handling of
a client's property, including both funds and files. Lawyers' treatment
.of client property has created negative publicity for lawyers. Indeed,
the court rules governing lawyers' fiduciary accounts, adopted by the
First and Second Departments in December, 1988,235 were designed
230. NYSBA Comm. on Proffessional Ethics, Op. 886 (1975).
231. See, e.g., NYSBA Comm. on Proffessional Ethics, Op. 368 (1974); Md. Formal
Ethics Op. 77-2, 10 MD. B.J. 39 (Summer 1977).
232. Mich. S.B. Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 340, 57 MICH. ST. B.J. 336 (1978).
233. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 340 (1975).
234. Id.
235. See N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.15 (1989) (First Department);
N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.12 (1989) (Second Department); Fox, Rules
for Fiduciaries Revised by Courts, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
1990-91]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
to buttress and ensure compliance with DR 9-102.
The most significant change in DR 9-102 was added by the Appel-
late Divisions. The Appellate Divisions incorporated into the Disci-
plinary Rule the provisions of the First and Second Department court
rules on lawyer trust accounts and recordkeeping,236 with two modifi-
cations.237 The provisions of the court rules include the following re-
quirements:238 (a) to establish in a bank or trust company in New
York one or more special accounts for the safekeeping of property of
others; (b) to designate those accounts in a manner sufficient to distin-
guish them from other accounts of the lawyer and (c) to maintain for
seven years a variety of records, including those of the lawyer's bank
accounts and client billing. In addition, the court rules provisions set
forth specific requirements with respect to authorized signatories on
the lawyer's special accounts, disposition of monies due to missing
clients, and maintenance of records upon the dissolution of a law firm.
Additional changes made by the Appellate Divisions would allow
lawyers to withdraw funds from the trust account by international (as
well as domestic) bank wire transfer with the written consent of the
party entitled to the funds. These changes would also permit lawyers
whose principal offices are outside New York State to maintain the
required records outside the state but to make them available at their
principal New York office when requested.239
Two other changes in DR 9-102 are worthy of note. First, new
provision DR 9-102(B)(1) recognizes that a lawyer may hold funds of
non-clients in the special account, for example, where a lawyer is act-
ing as an escrow agent. Second, a minor change to the prohibition
against the lawyer commingling a lawyer's own funds in the special
account has been made. DR 9-102(B)(3) allows a lawyer to deposit
enough of his or her own funds in the account not only to pay bank
charges but also to maintain the account. In that way, if the bank's
rules contain a minimum deposit amount to avoid service charges or
to be eligible to bear interest, a lawyer can deposit a sufficient amount
to meet the bank requirement.
On January 4, 1991, the Appellate Divisions jointly adopted several
236. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.15 (1989) (First Department);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.12 (1989) (Second Department).
237. Compare OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 116-17 with 1990 CODE, supra
note 1, DR 9-102.
238. N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.15 (1989) (First Department); N.Y.
COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.12 (1989) (Second Department); see 1990 CODE,
supra note 2, DR 9-102.
239. OCTOBER 1987 DRAFT, supra note 12, at 116-17.
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additional changes to DR 9-102. 240 The most significant changes in-
volve permissible locations of a lawyer's "special account" for funds
of clients and others, and provisions for maintenance of records upon
dissolution of a firm. These amendments, which were effective imme-
diately, resulted from comments made by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (New York City Bar).24'
The New York- City Bar had argued that lawyers should be permit-
ted to maintain escrow accounts outside New York.242 The Appellate
Divisions amended DR 9-102(B)(1) to provide that "special account"
funds may be maintained in a bank or trust company located outside
New York specifying the name and address of the bank or trust com-
pany where the funds are to be maintained.2 43 Similarly, the New
York City Bar had argued that the rule on dissolved law firms, which
required the partners to agree as to who should keep the firm's
records, was impractical, given the amount of discord in many firm
dissolutions. The Appellate Divisions amended DR 9-102(G) to pro-
vide that if the partners cannot agree on arrangements for maintain-
ing the firm's records, any partner or former partner may apply for
direction to the Appellate Division in which the principal office of the
firm is located, or to the court's designee (presumably the clerk of the
court). 2" Any such direction will be binding.
240. Joint Order of the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, First, Second, Third
and Fourth Judicial Departments, In the Matter of the Amendments of DR 9-102 of the
Disciplinary Rules of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (January 4, 1991)
(as yet unpublished order).
241. Letter from the Committee on Professional Responsibility of The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York to the Justices of the Appellate Division (February 8,
1990, and amended February 14, 1990).
242. Id.
243. New DR 9-102(B)(1) now reads:
B. SEPARATE AccouNTs
I. A lawyer who is in possession of funds belonging to another person incident
to the lawyer's practice of law, shall maintain in a bank or trust company
within the State of New York in the lawyer's own name, or in the name of a
firm of lawyers of which he or she is a member, or in the name of the lawyer
or firm of lawyers by whom he or she is employed, a special account or
accounts, separate from any business or personal accounts of the lawyer or
lawyer's firm, and separate from any accounts which the lawyer may main-
tain as executor, guardian, trustee or receiver, or in any other fiduciary ca-
pacity, into which special account or accounts all funds held in escrow or
otherwise intrusted to the lawyer or firm shall be deposited; provided, how-
ever, that such funds may be maintained in a bank or trust company located
outside the State of New York with the prior written approval of the person
to whom such funds belong specifying the name and address of the bank or
trust company where such funds are to be maintained.
244. As amended, DR 9-102(G) states:
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IV. Thoughts on the Concept of Uniformity of Regulation, the
Adoption Process and the Results
A. Uniformity
Although thirty-nine states have adopted the Model Rules,2 4 sub-
stantial variation exists from state to state, particularly with respect
to the rules governing disclosure of client confidential information.2
The major industrial and financial states, including New York, have
customized the Model Code to their individual needs.247 Even if most
of the concepts in the various codes are the same, this balkanization of
the rules of professional responsibility at a time when the practice of
law is becoming increasingly national is indeed ironic.
Traditionally lawyers have been subject to discipline only in the
state in which they are admitted to practice. 248  Nevertheless, both
Nevada and Arkansas have asserted jurisdiction over lawyers not ad-
mitted in the state.24 9 Thus, the lack of uniformity among the states
should be of concern to all lawyers with clients in other states.25°
B. The Process For Change
The process for change in New York has proved exceedingly cum-
bersome. The current Disciplinary Rules have evolved over 61/2 years
from the time the ABA approved the Model Rules in August, 1983
until the Appellate Divisions approved the amended Disciplinary
Rules in April, 1990. Several reasons existed for this delay. The pro-
posed changes were extensive, and the time needed for careful consid-
eration was even greater. The State Bar Association House of
G. DISSOLUTION OF A FIRM.
Upon the dissolution of any firm of lawyers, the former partners or mem-
bers shall make appropriate arrangements for the maintenance by one of
them or by a successor firm of the records specified in DR 9-102(D). In the
absence of agreement on such arrangements, any partner or former partner
or member of a firm in dissolution may apply to the Appellate Division in
which the principal office of the law firm is located or its designee for direc-
tion and such direction shall be binding upon all partners, former partners
or members.
245. See, e.g., Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 99, at 01:3 - 01:4 (De-
cember 19, 1990).
246. See id., No. 42, at 01:11 - 01:41.
247. Id.
248. See ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEED-
INGS § 4.1 (1983).
249. See NEV. Sup. CT. R. 99.1; ARKANSAS MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 8.5 (1989).
250. See generally ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of
Rules of Professional Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the
States, 45 Bus. LAW. 1229 (1990).
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Delegates meets only quarterly; thus, any consideration that could not
be completed at one meeting automatically was delayed for at least
three months. The State Bar Association's rejection of the Halpern
Committee's modified version of the Model Rules produced an addi-
tional 19-month delay during which the Jones Committee drafted
amendments to the 1970 Code. Finally, the Appellate Divisions have
no established procedures for dealing with recommendations regard-
ing Disciplinary Rules. This accounts for at least some of the delay
between the time the State Bar transmitted the proposed changes to
the Appellate Divisions in October, 1987 and the final action of the
Appellate Divisions in April, 1990.
The old method by which the Appellate Divisions adopted the Dis-
ciplinary Rules recommended by the State Bar ensured uniformity
among the departments. The new procedure produced a uniform set
of court rules only because of the strong desire for uniformity ex-
* pressed by the members of the Kane Committee and the four Presid-
ing Justices of the Appellate Divisions. There were several issues that
might have produced different rules in one or more departments.
Formerly, the rules of professional responsibility changed so rarely
that there was no need for a formal procedure for amending them.
Given the current pace at which the profession is changing, however,
it is desirable to establish a more formal mechanism for revising the
rules. To ensure the greatest acceptance of such revisions, and to re-
duce the amount of time that the Appellate Divisions must devote to
proposed revisions, the State Bar should continue to play a key role in
initiating changes. The State Bar should establish a permanent com-
mittee, or a subcommittee of the Committee on Professional Ethics, to
act as a clearinghouse for suggestions to amend the Code. It would
also be useful for the Appellate Divisions to adopt procedures for uni-
formly addressing changes to the Disciplinary Rules recommended by
the State Bar.
C. The Results
Is the 1990 Code substantially different from the version of the
Model Rules recommended by the Halpern Committee25" ' or from the
Model Rules as adopted by the ABA2 5 2 and, with some variation, by
thirty-nine states? 253 Generally, there are few major substantive dif-
ferences. Significantly, the Model Rules do not address discrimina-
251. HALPERN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8.
252. MODEL RULES, supra note 3.
253. See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 42, at 01:11 - 01:41 (Decem-
ber 21, 1987).
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tion by lawyers. The most notable difference between the 1990 Code
and the Model Rules, however, is that New York'has refused to fol-
low the ABA's new balance between the lawyer's obligation to pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of the client and the lawyer's duty to
prevent frauds upon the court. The Model Rules, in Model Rule
3.3(a) and (b),254 provide that a lawyer must disclose a material fact to
the tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid "assisting a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act by the client," even if compliance requires dis-
closure of confidential client information. DR 7-102(B)(1) of the
Code, on the other hand, exempts from disclosure any information
protected as a confidence or secret.
In addition, the Model Rules contain special provisions governing
the lawyer's role as a negotiator or mediator and as a provider of legal
opinions to third parties, 255 a role not considered crucial by the Jones
Committee. The Model Rules, as most recently amended, are also
somewhat more liberal with respect to in-person solicitation of em-
ployment. For example, Model Rule 7.3(a) 256 would allow a lawyer
to engage in in-person solicitation of a person with any prior profes-
sional relationship with the lawyer. The comment to that section ex-
plains that a lawyer is less likely to engage in abusive practices against
an individual with whom he or she has a prior professional relation-
ship.257 In contrast, DR 2-104(D) authorizes the lawyer to solicit em-
ployment from a former client only if the solicited employment is
germane to the former employment. Moreover, Model Rule 7.3
would allow in-person solicitation of any client where the pecuniary
gain of the lawyer is not a significant motive of the solicitation (e.g.
the solicitation is for pro bono representation).258
Most lawyers will find no practical differences between the 1990
Code and the Model Rules. Nevertheless, the State Bar preferred the
existing format, and declined to make wholesale changes in language
where no change in substance was intended. In that regard, the
amendments will enable practitioners to ascertain immediately
changes that have been effected.
Perhaps the most important contribution made by the lengthy ef-
fort to amend the 1970 Code is the substantial public debate on the
ethics of the profession that it engendered. The responsibilities of the
254. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 3.3(a),(b).
255. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 2.2, 4.1-4.4.
256. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 7.3(a).
257. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 7.3(a) comment.
258. See also Matter of Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d 229, 236, 457 N.E.2d 682, 686, 469 N.Y.S.2d
577, 581 (1983) (a solicitation by a public interest group presents no potential for conflict
of interest), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
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lawyer to an individual client and to society at large were extensively
discussed, and both lawyers and the public have become sensitized to
the dilemmas that face practitioners in their everyday law practice,
where gritty reality and aspirational ethical goals intersect. The 1990
Code is designed to provide both high ethical aspirations and practi-
cal guidance to the lawyer. While no code can provide a complete




THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Adopted by the New York State Bar Association, effective January
1, 1970, as amended effective September 1, 1990.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
No codification of principles can expressly cover all situations that
may arise. Accordingly, conduct that does not appear to violate the
express terms of any Disciplinary Rule nevertheless may be found by
an enforcing agency to be the subject of discipline on the basis of a
general principle illustrated by a Disciplinary Rule or on the basis of
an accepted common law principle applicable to lawyers.
DEFINITIONS
As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
2. "Law firm" includes, but is not limited to, a professional legal
corporation, the legal department of a corporation or other
organization and a legal services organization.
6. "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory bod-
ies. A tribunal shall be deemed "available" when it would
have jurisdiction to hear a complaint, if timely brought.
CANON 1
A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and
Competence of the Legal Profession
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 1-4 The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if con-
duct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the
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attention of the proper officials. A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to
those officials all knowledge, other than knowledge protected as a
confidence or secret, of conduct of another lawyer which the lawyer
believes clearly to be a violation of the Disciplinary Rules that raises a
substantial question as to the other lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness in other respects as a lawyer. A lawyer should, upon re-
quest, serve on and assist committees and boards having responsibility
for the administration of the Disciplinary Rules.
EC 1-7 A lawyer should avoid bias and condescension toward, and
treat with dignity and respect, all parties, witnesses, lawyers, court
employees, and other persons involved in the legal process.
EC 1-8 A law firm should adopt measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Disciplinary Rules and that
the conduct of non-lawyers employed by the firm is compatible with
the professional obligations of the lawyers in the firm. Such measures
may include informal supervision and occasional admonition, a proce-
dure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical
problems directly to a designated senior lawyer or special committee,
and continuing legal education in professional ethics.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 1-102 Misconduct.
A. A lawyer shall not:
1. Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
2. Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
3. Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
4. Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
5. Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
6. Unlawfully discriminate in the practice of law, including in
hiring, promoting or otherwise determining conditions of em-
ployment, on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national ori-
gin, sex, disability, or marital status.
Where there is available a tribunal of competent jurisdiction,
other than a Departmental Disciplinary Committee, a com-
plaint of professional misconduct based on unlawful discrimi-
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nation shall be brought before such tribunal in the first
instance. A certified copy of a determination by such a tribu-
nal, which has become final and enforceable, and as to which
the right to judicial or appellate review has been exhausted,
finding that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawful discrimi-
natory practice shall constitute prima facie evidence of profes-
sional misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding.
7. Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities.
A. A lawyer possessing knowledge, not protected as a confidence or
secret, of a violation of DR 1-102 that raises a substantial ques-
tion as to another lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness in
other respects as a lawyer shall report such knowledge to a tribu-
nal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation.
B. A lawyer possessing knowledge or evidence, not protected as a
confidence or secret, concerning another lawyer or a judge shall
reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper request of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon
the conduct of lawyers or judges.
DR 1-104 Responsibilities of a Supervisory Lawyer.
A. A lawyer shall be responsible for a violation of the Disciplinary
Rules by another lawyer or for conduct of a non-lawyer em-
ployed or retained by or associated with the lawyer that would be
a violation of the Disciplinary Rules if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) The lawyer orders the conduct; or
(2) The lawyer has supervisory authority over the other lawyer
or the non-lawyer, and knows or should have known of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
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CANON 2
A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty
to Make Legal Counsel Available
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Financiol Ability to Employ Counsel: Persons Able to Pay
Reasonable Fees
EC 2-20 Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been
commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce
claims. The historical bases of their acceptance are that (1) they
often, and in a variety of circumstances, provide the only practical
means by which one having a claim against another can economically
afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to pros-
ecute a claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of the claim produces a
fund out of which the fee can be paid. Although a lawyer generally
should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one
who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily improper
for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a case,
to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client
who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that
arrangement. Because of the human relationships involved and the
unique character of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in
domestic relation cases are rarely justified. In administrative agency
proceedings, contingent fee contracts should be governed by the same
considerations as in other civil cases. Public policy properly con-
demns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases, largely on the
ground that legal services in criminal cases do not produce a fund out
of which the fee can be paid.
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: Persons Unable to Pay
Reasonable Fees
EC 2-25 A lawyer has an obligation to render public interest and pro
bono legal service. A lawyer may fulfill this responsibility by provid-
ing professional services at no fee or at a reduced fee to individuals of
limited financial means or to public service or charitable groups or
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organizations, or by participation in programs and organizations spe-
cifically designed to increase the availability of legal services. In addi-
tion, lawyers or law firms are encouraged to supplement this
responsibility through the financial and other support of organiza-
tions that provide legal services to persons of limited means.
Acceptance and Retention of Employment
EC 2-27 History is replete with instances of distinguished sacrificial
services by lawyers who have represented unpopular clients and
causes. Regardless of personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline
representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community
reaction is adverse. A lawyer's representation of a client, including
representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of
the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 2-101 Publicity and Advertising.
A. A lawyer on behalf of himself or herself or partners or associates,
shall not use or disseminate or participate in the preparation or
dissemination of any public communication containing state-
ments or claims that are false, deceptive, misleading or cast re-
flection on the legal profession as a whole.
B. Advertising or other publicity by lawyers, including participation
in public functions, shall not contain puffery, self-laudation,
claims regarding the quality of the lawyers' legal services, or
claims that cannot be measured or verified.
C. It is proper to include information, provided its dissemination
does not violate the provisions of subdivisions (A) and (B) of this
section, as to:
1. education, degrees and other scholastic distinctions, dates of
admission to any bar; areas of the law in which the lawyer or
law firm practices, as authorized by the Code of Professional
Responsibility; public offices and teaching positions held;
memberships in bar associations or other professional socie-
ties or organizations, including offices and committee assign-
ments therein; foreign language fluency;
2. names of clients regularly represented, provided that the cli-
ent has given prior written consent;
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3. bank references; credit arrangements accepted; prepaid or
group legal services programs in which the attorney or firm
participates; and
4. legal fees for initial consultation; contingent fee rates in civil
matters when accompanied by a statement disclosing whether
percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs
and disbursements; range of fees for services, provided that
there be available to the public free of charge a written state-
ment clearly describing the scope of each advertised service;
hourly rates; and fixed fees for specified legal services.
D. Advertising and publicity shall be designed to educate the public
to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information rele-
vant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel. Informa-
tion other than that specifically authorized in subdivision (C) of
this section that is consistent with these purposes may be dissem-
inated providing that it does not violate any other provisions of
this Rule.
E. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal
services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the
public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each
advertised service, which statement shall be delivered to the cli-
ent at the time of retainer for any such service. Such legal serv-
ices shall include all those services which are recognized as
reasonable and necessary under local custom in the area of prac-
tice in the community where the services are performed.
F. If the advertisement is broadcast, it shall be prerecorded or taped
and approved for broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording or
videotape of the actual transmission shall be retained by the law-
yer for a period of not less than one year following such transmis-
sion. All advertisements of legal services that are mailed, or are
distributed other than by radio, television, directory, newspaper,
magazine or other periodical, by a lawyer or law firm with an
office for the practice of law in this state, shall also be subject to
the following provisions:
1. A copy of each advertisement shall at the time of its initial
mailing or distribution be filed with the Departmental Disci-
plinary Committee of the appropriate judicial department.
2. Such advertisement shall contain no reference to the fact of
filing.
3. If such advertisement is directed to a predetermined address,
a list, containing the names and addresses of all persons to
whom the advertisement is being or will thereafter be mailed
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or distributed, shall be retained by the lawyer or law firm for a
period of not less than one year following the last date of
mailing or distribution.
4. The advertisements filed pursuant to this subdivision shall be
open to public inspection.
5. The requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to such
professional cards or other announcements the distribution of
which is authorized by DR 2-102(A).
G. If a lawyer or law firm advertises a range of fees or an hourly rate
for services, the lawyer or law firm may not charge more than the
fee advertised for such services. If a lawyer or law firm adver-
tises a fixed fee for specified legal services, or performs services
described in a fee schedule, the lawyer or law firm may not
charge more than the fixed fee for such stated legal service as set
forth in the advertisement or fee schedule, unless the client
agrees in writing that the services performed or to be performed
were not legal services referred to or implied in the advertisement
or in the fee schedule and, further, that a different fee arrange-
ment shall apply to the transaction.
H. Unless otherwise specified in the advertisement, if a lawyer pub-
lishes any fee information authorized under this Disciplinary
Rule in a publication which is published more frequently than
once per month, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation
made therein for a period of not less than 30 days after such
publication. If a lawyer publishes any fee information author-
ized under this Rule in a publication which is published once per
month or less frequently, the lawyer shall be bound by any repre-
sentation made therein until the publication of the succeeding
issue. If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized
under this Rule in a publication which has no fixed date for pub-
lication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound by any
representation made therein for a reasonable period of time after
publication, but in no event less than 90 days.
I. Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any fee infor-
mation authorized under this Rule, the lawyer shall be bound by
any representation made therein for a period of not less than 30
days after such broadcast.
J. A lawyer shall not compensate or give any thing of value to rep-
resentatives of the press, radio, television or other communica-
tion medium in anticipation of or in return for professional
publicity in a news item.
K. All advertisements of legal services shall include the name, office
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address and telephone number of the attorney or law firm whose
services are being offered.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, and Signs.
A. A lawyer or law firm may use professional cards, professional
announcement cards, office signs, letterheads or similar profes-
sional notices or devices, provided the same do not violate any
statute or court rule, and are in accordance with DR 2-101, in-
cluding the following:
1. A professional card of a lawyer identifying the lawyer by
name and as a lawyer, and giving addresses, telephone num-
bers, the name of the law firm, and any information permitted
under DR 2-105. A professional card of a law firm may also
give the names of members and associates.
2. A professional announcement card stating new or changed as-
sociations or addresses, change of firm name, or similar mat-
ters pertaining to the professional offices of a lawyer or law
firm. It may state biographical data, the names of members of
the firm and associates and the names and dates of predeces-
sor firms in a continuing line of succession. It shall not state
the nature of the practice except as permitted under DR 2-
105.
3. A sign in or near the office and in the building directory iden-
tifying the law office. The sign shall not state the nature of the
practice, except as permitted under DR 2-105.
4. A letterhead identifying the lawyer by name and as a lawyer,
and giving addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the law
firm, associates and any information permitted under DR 2-
105. A letterhead of a law firm may also give the names of
members and associates, and names and dates relating to de-
ceased and retired members. A lawyer may be designated "Of
Counsel" on a letterhead if there is a continuing relationship
with a lawyer or law firm, other than as a partner or associate.
A lawyer or law firm may be designated as "General Coun-
sel" or by similar professional reference on stationery of a cli-
ent if the lawyer or the firm devotes a substantial amount of
professional time in the representation of that client. The let-
terhead of a law firm may give the names and dates of prede-
cessor firms in a continuing line of succession.
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DR 2-103 Solicitation and Recommendation of Professional
Employment.
A. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, seek professional em-
ployment for the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer
from a person who has not sought advice regarding employment
of the lawyer in violation of any statute or existing court rule in
the judicial department in which the lawyer practices.
C. A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recom-
mend or promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of the
lawyer's partner or associate, or any other affiliated lawyer as a
private practitioner, other than by advertising or publicity not
proscribed by DR 2-101, except that:
3. The lawyer may request such a recommendation from an-
other lawyer or an organization performing legal services.
D. A lawyer or the lawyer's partner or associate or any other affili-
ated lawyer may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may
cooperate with one of the following offices or organizations
which promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of a part-
ner or associate or any other affiliated lawyer if there is no inter-
ference with the exercise of independent professional judgment
on behalf of the client:
1. A legal aid office or public defender office
a. Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school;
b. Operated or sponsored by a bona fide, non-profit commu-
nity organization;
c. Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency; or
d. Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association;
2. A military legal assistance office;
3. A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored or approved by
a bar association.
4. Any bona fide organization which recommends, furnishes or
pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided
the following conditions are satisfied:
a. Neither the lawyer, no[r] the lawyer's partner, nor associ-
ate, nor any other affiliated lawyer nor any non-lawyer,
shall have initiated or promoted such organization for the
1990 AMENDMENTS
primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to
such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
b. Such organization is not operated for the purpose of pro-
curing legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a
private practitioner outside of the legal services program of
the organization.
c. The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are
furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in the matter.
d. Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal
services furnished or paid for by the organization may, if
such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other
than that furnished, selected or approved by the organiza-
tion for the particular matter involved; and the legal ser-
vice plan of such organization provides appropriate relief
for any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that
representation by counsel furnished, selected or approved
would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the cir-
cumstances of the matter involved; and the plan provides
an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief.
e. The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such
organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of
court or other legal requirements that govern its legal ser-
vice operations.
f. Such organization has filed with the appropriate discipli-
nary authority, to the extent required by such authority, at
least annually a report with respect to its legal service plan,
if any, showing its terms, its schedule of benefits, its sub-
scription charges, agreements with counsel and financial re-
sults of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so,
the lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such
failure.
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
A. A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to an individual to
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice, in violation of any statute or court
rule.
B. A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, for-
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mer client (if the advice is germane to the former employment) or
one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
C. A lawyer may accept employment which results from participa-
tion in activities designed to educate the public to recognize legal
problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel or to utilize
available legal services.
D. A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by a qualified
legal assistance organization enumerated in DR 2-103(D) (1)
through (4) may represent a member or beneficiary thereof, to
the extent and under the conditions prescribed therein.
E. Without affecting the right to accept employment, a lawyer may
speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so long as
the lawyer does not undertake to give individual advice.
F. Subject to compliance with the provisions of DR 2-103(A), if
success in asserting rights or defenses of a client in litigation in
the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of
others, a lawyer may accept employment from those contacted
for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.
DR 2-106 Fee for Legal Services.
A. A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect
an illegal or excessive fee.
B. A fee is excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm convic-
tion that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be
considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent or made known to the client, that
the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer.
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by
circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client.
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7. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or law-
yers performing the services.
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
C. A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or
collect:
1. A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case; or
2. Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce
or upon the amount of maintenance, support, equitable distri-
bution, or property settlement; or
3. A fee proscribed by law or rule of court.
D. Promptly after a lawyer has been employed in a contingent fee
matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a writing stating
the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the
event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses
to be deducted from the recovery and whether such expenses are
to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall pro-
vide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of
the matter, and if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to
the client and the method of its determination.
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
A. A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another
lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of the lawyer's law
firm or law office, unless:
1. The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a
full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
2. The division is in proportion to the services performed by
each lawyer or, by a writing given to the client, each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation.
3. The total fee of the lawyers does not exceed reasonable com-
pensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
* * *
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DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
A. In general.
2. Even when withdrawal is otherwise permitted or required
under DR 2-1 10(A)(1), (B), or (C), a lawyer shall not with-
draw from employment until the lawyer has taken steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to avoid foreseeable prejudice to
the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the cli-
ent, allowing time for employment of other counsel, deliver-
ing to the client all papers and property to which the client is
entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.
B. Mandatory withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permis-
sion if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment,
and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall with-
draw from employment, if:
2. The lawyer knows or it is obvious that continued employment
will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
3. The lawyer's mental or physical condition renders it unrea-
sonably difficult to carry out the employment effectively.
C. Permissive withdrawal.
Except as stated in DR 2-110(A), a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without
material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
1. The client:
a. Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not war-
ranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.
b. Persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent.
c. Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct which is
illegal or prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
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d. By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the
lawyer to carry out employment effectively.
e. Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the
lawyer engage in conduct which is contrary to the judg-
ment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules.
f. Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the
lawyer as to expenses or fees.
g. Has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud.
2. The lawyer's continued employment is likely to result in a vio-
lation of a Disciplinary Rule.
3. The lawyer's inability to work with co-counsel indicates that
the best interests of the client likely will be served by
withdrawal.
4. The lawyer's mental or physical condition renders it difficult
for the lawyer to carry out the employment effectively.
5. The lawyer's client knowingly and freely assents to termina-
tion of the employment.
6. The lawyer believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending
before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of
other good cause for withdrawal.
CANON 4
A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 4-2 The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously
does not preclude a lawyer from revealing information when the cli-
ent consents after full disclosure, when necessary to perform the law-
yer's professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary
Rule, or when required by law. Unless the client otherwise directs, a
lawyer may disclose the affairs of the client to partners or associates of
his or her firm. It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal
operation of a law office exposes confidential professional information
to non-lawyer employees of the office, particularly secretaries and
those having access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise
care in selecting and training employees so that the sanctity of all
confidences and secrets of clients may be preserved. If the obligation
extends to two or more clients as to the same information, a lawyer
1990-91]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
should obtain the permission of all before revealing the information.
A lawyer must always be sensitive to the rights and wishes of the
client and act scrupulously in the making of decisions which may in-
volve the disclosure of information obtained in the professional rela-
tionship. Thus, in the absence of consent of the client after full
disclosure, a lawyer should not associate another lawyer in the han-
dling of a matter; nor should the lawyer, in the absence of consent,
seek counsel from another lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility
that the identity of the client or the client's confidences or secrets
would be revealed to such lawyer. Both social amenities and profes-
sional duty should cause a lawyer to shun indiscreet conversations
concerning clients.
EC 4-3 Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a
lawyer to give limited information to an outside agency necessary for
statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, banking, print-
ing, or other legitimate purposes, provided the lawyer exercises due
care in the selection of the agency and warns the agency that the in-
formation must be kept confidential.
EC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of the cli-
ent. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists with-
out regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that
others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a
manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, the
lawyer should avoid professional discussions in the presence of per-
sons to whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obliga-
tion to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to
assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client.
EC 4-7 The lawyer's exercise of discretion to disclose confidences and
secrets requires consideration of a wide range of factors and should
not be subject to reexamination. A lawyer is afforded the professional
discretion to reveal the intention of a client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime and cannot be subjected to
discipline either for revealing or not revealing such intention or infor-
mation. In exercising this discretion, however, the lawyer should con-
sider such factors as the seriousness of the potential injury to others if
the prospective crime is committed, the likelihood that it will be com-
mitted and its imminence, the apparent absence of any other feasible
way in which the potential injury can be prevented, the extent to
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which the client may have attempted to involve the lawyer in the pro-
spective crime, the circumstances under which the lawyer acquired
the information of the client's intent, and any other possibly aggravat-
ing or extenuating circumstances. In any case, a disclosure adverse to
the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to the purpose.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
C. A lawyer may reveal:
1. Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
2. Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules or required by law or court order.
3. The intention of a client to commit a crime and the informa-
tion necessary to prevent the crime.
4. Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect the
lawyer's fee or to defend the lawyer or his or her employees or
associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
5. Confidences or secrets to the extent implicit in withdrawing a
written or oral opinion or representation previously given by
the lawyer and believed by the lawyer still to be relied upon
by a third person where the lawyer has discovered that the
opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate
information or is being used to further a crime or fraud.
CANON 5
A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on
Behalf of a Client
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Interests of a Lawyer That May Affect the Lawyer's Judgment
EC 5-4 If, in the course of the representation of a client, a lawyer is
permitted to receive from the client a beneficial ownership in literary
or media rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, the
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lawyer may be tempted to subordinate the interests of the client to the
lawyer's own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a
criminal case who obtains from the client television, radio, motion
picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other literary or media rights
with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of the
literary or media rights to the prejudice of the client. To prevent
these potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be
scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the
matter giving rise to the employment, even though the employment
has previously ended.
EC 5-8 A financial interest in the outcome of litigation also results if
monetary advances are made by the lawyer to the client. Although
this assistance generally is not encouraged, there are instances when it
is not improper to make loans to a client. For example, the advancing
or guaranteeing of payment of the costs and expenses of litigation by a
lawyer may be the only way a client can enforce a cause of action, but
the ultimate liability for such costs and expenses must be that of the
client except, where not prohibited by law or court rule, in the case of
an indigent client represented on a pro bono basis.
EC 5-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular
case whether the lawyer will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer
is both counsel and witness, the lawyer becomes more easily impeach-
able for interest and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely,
the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibil-
ity of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the
case. An advocate who becomes a witness is in the unseemly and
ineffective position of arguing his or her own credibility. The roles of
an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advo-
cate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a wit-
ness is to state facts objectively.
EC 5-18 A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar
entity owes allegiance to the entity and not.to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its
interests and the lawyer's professional judgment should not be influ-
enced by the personal desires of any person or organization. Occa-
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sionally, the lawyer may learn that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the entity is engaged in action, refuses to act,
or intends to act or to refrain from acting in a matter related to the
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the entity, or
a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the entity,
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the entity. In such event,
the lawyer should proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best inter-
est of the entity. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer should
give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its con-
sequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the
responsibility in the entity and the apparent motivation of the person
involved, the policies of the entity concerning such matters and any
other relevant considerations. Any measures taken should be
designed to minimize disruption of the entity and the risk of revealing
confidences and secrets of the entity. Such measures may include
among others: asking reconsideration of the matter, advising that a
separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to ap-
propriate authority in the entity, and referring the matter to higher
authority in the entity not involved in the wrongdoing, including, if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest au-
thority that can act in behalf of the entity as determined by applicable
law. Occasionally a lawyer for an entity is requested to represent a
stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other per-
son connected with the entity in an individual capacity; in such case
the lawyer may serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced
that differing interests are not present.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer
May Impair Independent Professional Judgment.
A. Except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, a law-
yer shall not accept employment if the exercise of professional
judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be
affected by the lawyer's own financial, business, property, or per-
sonal interests.
B. A lawyer shall not act, or accept employment that contemplates
the lawyer's acting, as an advocate before any tribunal if the law-
yer knows or it is obvious that the lawyer ought to be called as a
witness on behalf of the client, except that the lawyer may act as
an advocate and also testify:
1990.91]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
1. If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested issue.
2. If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and
there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be
offered in opposition to the testimony.
3. If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or the law-
yer's firm to the client.
4. As to any matter, if disqualification as an advocate would
work a substantial hardship on the client because of the dis-
tinctive value of the lawyer as counsel in the particular case.
C. Neither a lawyer nor the lawyer's firm shall accept employment
in contemplated or pending litigation if the lawyer knows or it is
obvious that the lawyer or another lawyer in the lawyer's firm
may be called as a witness other than on behalf of the client, and
it is apparent that the testimony would or might be prejudicial to
the client.
DR 5-102 Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a
Witness.
A. If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending lit-
igation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer ought to
be called as a witness on behalf of the client, the lawyer shall
withdraw as an advocate before the tribunal, except that the law-
yer may continue as an advocate and may testify in the circum-
stances enumerated in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).
B. If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending lit-
igation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer or a law-
yer in his or her firm may be called as a witness other than on
behalf of the client, the lawyer may continue the representation
until it is apparent that the testimony is or may be prejudicial to
the client at which point the lawyer and the firm must withdraw
from acting as an advocate before the tribunal.
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation.
B. While representing a client in connection with contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee finan-
cial assistance to the client, except that:
1. A lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation,
including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of
medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting
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evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for
such expenses.
2. Unless prohibited by law or rule of court, a lawyer represent-
ing an indigent client on a pro bono basis may pay court costs
and reasonable expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
DR 5-104 Limiting Business Relations with a Client.
B. Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to em-
ployment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or un-
derstanding with a client or a prospective client by which the
lawyer acquires an interest in literary or media rights with re-
spect to the subject matter of the employment or proposed
employment.
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the
Interests of Another Client May Impair the
Independent Professional Judgment of the
Lawyer.
A. A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or
is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the prof-
fered employment, or if it would be likely to involve the lawyer in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105 (C).
B. A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise
of independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be
or is likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer's representation
of another client, or if it would be likely to involve the lawyer in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105 (C).
C. In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that the lawyer can ade-
quately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of the lawyer's independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of each.
D. While lawyers are associated in a law firm, none of them shall
knowingly accept or continue employment when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so under DR 5-
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101(A), DR 5-105(A), (B) or (C), DR 5-108, or DR 9-101(B)
except as otherwise provided therein.
DR 5-108 Conflict of Interest-Former Client.
A. Except with the consent of a former client after full disclosure a
lawyer who has represented the former client in a matter shall
not:
1. Thereafter represent another person in the same or a substan-
tially related matter in which that person's interests are mate-
rially adverse to the interests of the former client.
2. Use any confidences or secrets of the former client except as
permitted by DR 4-101(C) or when the confidence or secret
has become generally known.
DR 5-109 Conflict of Interest--Organization as Client.
A. When a lawyer employed or retained by an organization is deal-
ing with the organization's directors, officers, employees, mem-
bers, shareholders or other constituents, and it appears that the
organization's interests may differ from those of the constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing, the lawyer shall explain that
the lawyer is the lawyer for the organization and not for any of
the constituents.
DR 5-110 Membership in Legal Service Organization.
A. A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a not-for-
profit legal services organization, apart from the law firm in
which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organiza-
tion serves persons having interests that differ from those of a
client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, provided that the lawyer
shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the
organization:
1. If participating in the decision or action would be incompati-
ble with the lawyer's duty of loyalty to a client under Canon
5; or
2. Where the decision or action could have a material adverse
effect on the representation of a client of the organization





A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 6-4 Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper
care to safeguard the interests of the client. If a lawyer has accepted
employment in a matter beyond the lawyer's competence but in which
the lawyer expected to become competent, the lawyer should dili-
gently undertake the work and study necessary to be qualified. In
addition to being qualified to handle a particular matter, the lawyer's
obligation to the client requires adequate preparation for and appro-
priate attention to the legal work, as well as promptly responding to
inquiries from the client.
EC 6-6 A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit
prospectively the lawyer's individual liability to the client for mal-
practice nor shall a lawyer settle a claim for malpractice with an
otherwise unrepresented client without first advising the client that
independent representation is appropriate. A lawyer who handles the
affairs of the client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability
for professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of
the client properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer who is
a stockholder in or is associated with a professional legal corporation
may, however, limit the lawyer's liability for malpractice of associates
in the corporation, but only to the extent permitted by law.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 6-101 Failing to Act Competently.
A. A lawyer shall not:
1. Handle a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should
know that he or she is not competent to handle, without asso-
ciating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
2. Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.
3. Neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.
DR 6-102 Limiting Liability to Client.
A. A lawyer shall not seek, by contract or other means, to limit pro-
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spectively the lawyer's individual liability to a client for malprac-
tice, or, without first advising that person that independent
representation is appropriate in connection therewith, to settle a
claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former
client.
CANON 7
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds
of the Law
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Duty of the Lawyer to a Client
EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent the client with zeal does
not militate against the concurrent obligations to treat with considera-
tion all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the inflic-
tion of needless harm.
EC 7-14 A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative
to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation
that is obviously unfair. A government lawyer not having such dis-
cretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy
submitted to the lawyer should so advise his or her superiors and rec-
ommend the avoidance of unfair litigation. A government lawyer in a
civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek
justice and to develop a full and fair record, and should not use his or
her position or the economic power of the government to harass par-
ties or to bring about unjust settlements or results. The responsibili-
ties of government lawyers with respect to the compulsion of
testimony and other information are generally the same as those of
public prosecutors.
Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice
EC 7-23 The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal
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to be fully informed unless the pertinent law is presented by the law-
yers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable
law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the
matter before it. The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer
will present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to
the client. Where a lawyer knows of controlling legal authority di-
rectly adverse to the position of the client, the lawyer should inform
the tribunal of its existence unless the adversary has done so; but,
having made such disclosure, the lawyer may challenge its soundness
in whole or in part.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously.
A. A lawyer shall not intentionally:
1. Fail to seek the lawful objectives of the client through reason-
ably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary
Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not
violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to rea-
sonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice
the rights of the client, by being punctual in fulfilling all pro-
fessional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by
treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved
in the legal process.
2. Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a
client for professional services, but the lawyer may withdraw
as permitted under DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
3. Prejudice or damage the client during the course of the pro-
fessional relationship, except as required under DR 7-102(B).
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
B. A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
1. The client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is unable
to do so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the affected per-
1990-91]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
son or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a
confidence or secret.
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct.
B. In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:
1. Controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and which is not disclosed
by opposing counsel.
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity.
A. A lawyer participating in or associated with a criminal or civil
matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding.
B. A statement ordinarily is likely to prejudice materially an adjudi-
cative proceeding when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury,
a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in
incarceration, and the statement relates to:
1. The character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the
identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or
witness.
2. In a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcer-
ation, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the
existence or contents of any confession, admission, or state-
ment given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal
or failure to make a statement.
3. The performance or results of any examination or test or the
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or
test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to
be presented.
4. Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or
suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration.
5. Information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
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likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if
disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial
trial.
6. The fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, un-
less there is included therein a statement explaining that the
charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is pre-
sumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.
C. Provided that the statement complies with DR 7-107(A), a law-
yer involved with the investigation or litigation of a matter may
state the following without elaboration:
1. The general nature of the claim or defense.
2. The information contained in a public record.
3. That an investigation of the matter is in progress.
4. The scheduling or result of any step in litigation.
5. A request for assistance in obtaining evidence and informa-
tion necessary thereto.
6. A warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the
likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public
interest.
7. In a criminal case:
a. The identity, age, residence, occupation and family status
of the accused.
b. If the accused has not been apprehended, information nec-
essary to aid in apprehension of that person.
c. The fact, time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, use
of weapons, and a description of physical evidence seized,
other than as contained only in a confession, admission, or
statement.
d. The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agen-
cies and the length of the investigation.
CANON 8
A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 8-4 Whenever a lawyer seeks legislative or administrative changes,
the lawyer should identify the capacity in which he or she appears,
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whether on behalf of the lawyer, a client, or the public. A lawyer may
advocate such changes on behalf a client even though the lawyer does
not agree with them. But when a lawyer purports to act on behalf of
the public, the lawyer should espouse only those changes which the
lawyer conscientiously believes to be in the public interest. Lawyers
involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a
lawyer-client relationship with the organization. In determining the
nature and scope of participation in law reform activities, a lawyer
should be mindful of obligations under Canon 5, particularly DR 5-
101 through DR 5-110. A lawyer is professionally obligated to pro-
tect the integrity of the organization by making an appropriate disclo-
sure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client
might be materially affected.
CANON 9




DR 9-101 Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety.
B. Except as law may otherwise expressly permit:
1. A lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee, and no lawyer in
a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly
undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:
a. The disqualified lawyer is effectively screened from any
participation, direct or indirect, including discussion, in
the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom;
and
b. There are no other circumstances in the particular repre-
sentation that create an appearance of impropriety.
2. A lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confi-
dential government information about a person, acquired
when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not
represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that
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person in a matter in which the information could be used to
the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which
that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or con-
tinue representation in the matter only if the disqualified law-
yer is effectively screened from any participation, direct or
indirect, including discussion, in the matter and is appor-
tioned no part of the fee therefrom.
3. A lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:
a. Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially while in private practice or
non-governmental employment, unless under applicable
law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized
to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or
b. Negotiate for private employment with any person who is
involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in
which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially.
D. A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or
spouse shall not represent in any matter a client whose interests
differ from those of another party to the matter who the lawyer
knows is represented by the other lawyer unless the client con-
sents to the representation after full disclosure and the lawyer
concludes that the lawyer can adequately represent the interests
of the client.
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of Others;
Fiduciary Responsibility; Maintenance of Bank
Accounts; Recordkeeping; Examination of
Records.
A. Prohibition Against Commingling.
A lawyer in possession of any funds or other property belonging
to another person, where such possession is incident to his or her
practice of law, is a fiduciary, and must not commingle such
property with his or her own.
B. Separate Accounts.
1. A lawyer who is in possession of funds belonging to another
person incident to the lawyer's practice of law, shall maintain
in a bank or trust company within the State of New York in
the lawyer's own name, or in the name of a firm of lawyers of
which he or she is a member, or in the name of the lawyer or
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firm of lawyers by whom he or she is employed, a special ac-
count or accounts, separate from any business or personal ac-
counts of the lawyer or lawyer's firm, and separate from any
accounts which the lawyer may maintain as executor, guard-
ian, trustee or receiver, or in any other fiduciary capacity, into
which special account or accounts all funds held in escrow or
otherwise entrusted to the lawyer or firm shall be deposited.
2. Other than accounts maintained by a lawyer as executor,
guardian, trustee or receiver, or in any other such fiduciary
capacity, all special accounts as well as all deposit slips relat-
ing to and checks drawn upon such special accounts, shall be
designated in a manner sufficient to distinguish them from all
other bank accounts maintained by the lawyer or the lawyer's
firm.
3. Funds reasonably sufficient to maintain the account or to pay
account charges may be deposited therein.
4. Funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part
presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm shall be kept
in such special account or accounts, but the portion belonging
to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless
the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by
the client or third person, in which event the disputed portion
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
C. Notification of Receipt of Property; Safekeeping; Rendering Ac-
counts; Payment or Delivery of Property.
A lawyer shall:
1. Promptly notify a client or third person of the receipt of
funds, securities, or other properties in which the client or
third person has an interest.
2. Identify and label securities and properties of a client or third
person promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit
box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
3. Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other
properties of a client or third person coming into the posses-
sion of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the cli-
ent or third person regarding them.
4. Promptly pay or deliver to the client or third person as re-
quested by the client or third person the funds, securities, or
other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the cli-
ent or third person is entitled to receive.
D. Required Bookkeeping Records.
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A lawyer shall maintain for seven years after the events which
they record.
1. The records of all deposits in and withdrawals from the ac-
counts specified in subdivision (B) of this Disciplinary Rule
and of any other bank account which concerns or affects the
lawyer's practice of law. These records shall specifically iden-
tify the date, source and description of each item deposited, as
well as the date, payee and purpose of each withdrawal or
disbursement.
2. A record for special accounts, showing the source of all funds
deposited in such accounts, the names of all persons for whom
the funds are or were held, the amount of such funds, the
description and amounts, and the names of all persons to
whom such funds were disbursed.
3. Copies of all retainer and compensation agreements with
clients.
4. Copies of all statements to clients or other persons showing
the disbursement of funds to-them or on their behalf.
5. Copies of all bills rendered to clients.
6. Copies of all records showing payments to lawyers, investiga-
tors or other persons, not in the lawyer's regular employ, for
services rendered or performed.
7. Copies of all retainer and closing statements filed with the Of-
fice of Court Administration.
8. All checkbooks and checkstubs, bank statements,
prenumbered cancelled checks and duplicate deposit slips.
Lawyers shall make accurate entries of all financial transac-
tions in their records of receipts and disbursements, in their
special accounts, in their ledger books or similar records, and
in any other books of account kept by them in the regular
course of their practice, which entries shall be made at or near
the time of the act, condition or event recorded.
E. Authorized Signatories.
All special account withdrawals shall be made only to a named
payee and not to cash. Such withdrawals shall be made by check
or, with the prior written approval of the party entitled to the
proceeds, by bank transfer. Only an attorney admitted to prac-
tice law in New York State shall be an authorized signatory of a
special account.
F. Missing Clients.
Whenever any sum of money is payable to a client and the lawyer
is unable to locate the client, the lawyer shall apply to the court
1990-91]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
in which the action was brought, or, if no action was commenced,
to the Supreme Court in the county in which the lawyer has his
or her office, for an order directing payment to the lawyer of his
or her fee and disbursements and to the clerk of the court of the
balance due to the client.
G. Dissolution of a Firm.
Upon the dissolution of any firm of lawyers, the former partners
or members shall make appropriate arrangements for the mainte-
nance by one of them or by a successor firm of the records speci-
fied in subdivision (D) of this Disciplinary Rule.
H. Availability of Bookkeeping Records; Records Subject to Pro-
duction in Disciplinary Investigations and Proceedings.
The financial records required by this Disciplinary Rule shall be
located, or made available, at the principal New York State office
of the lawyers subject hereto and any such records shall be pro-
duced in response to a notice or subpoena duces tecum issued in
connection with a complaint before or any investigation by the
appropriate grievance or departmental disciplinary committee,
or shall be produced at the direction of the appropriate Appellate
Division before any person designated by it. All books and
records produced pursuant to this subdivision shall be kept con-
fidential, except for the purpose of the particular proceeding, and
their contents shall not be disclosed by anyone in violation of the
lawyer-client privilege.
I. Disciplinary Action.
A lawyer who does not maintain and keep the accounts and
records as specified and required by this Disciplinary Rule, or
who does not produce any such records pursuant to this Rule,






THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Adopted by the New York State Bar Association, effective January
1, 1970, as amended through April 29, 1978.
CANON 1
A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and
Competence of the Legal Profession
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 1-4 The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if con-
duct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the
attention of the proper officials. A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to
those officials all unprivileged knowledge of conduct of lawyers which
he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules. A law-
yer should, upon request, serve on and assist committees and boards
having responsibility for the administration of the Disciplinary Rules.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 1-102 Misconduct.
A. A lawyer shall not:
3. Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
6. Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fit-
ness to practice law.
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities.
A. A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR
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1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other author-
ity empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.
B. A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence con-
cerning another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowl-
edge or evidence upon proper request of a tribunal or other
authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of
lawyers or judges.
CANON 2
A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to
Make Legal Counsel Available
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 2-25 Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay
reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their
services or accepted court appointments on behalf of such individuals.
The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable
to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal in-
volvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the
most rewarding experiences -in the life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, re-
gardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should
find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of
free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to
be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of individual lawyers
are often not enough to meet the need. Thus it has been necessary for
the profession to institute additional programs to provide legal serv-
ices. Accordingly, legal aid offices, lawyer referral services, and other
related programs have been developed, and others will be developed,
by the profession. Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to
meet this need for legal services.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 2-100 Publicity and Advertising Violative of Statute or Rule of
Court.
A. A lawyer shall not advertise or publicize himself or herself in
violation of any statute or rule of court.
B. Any rule of court applicable to advertising and publicity by law-
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yers, adopted by one or more of the appellate divisions of the
Supreme Court, shall automatically become a part of DR 2-101.
Should any such rule be adopted by fewer than all of the appel-
late divisions, such provisions shall be applicable only in the judi-
cial departments in which they have been adopted.
DR 2-101 Rules of Court Applicable to Advertising and Publicity
by Lawyers.
A. A lawyer on behalf of himself or herself or partners or associates,
shall not use or disseminate or participate in the preparation or
dissemination of any public communication containing state-
ments or claims that are false, deceptive, misleading or cast re-
flection on the legal profession as a whole.
B. Advertising or other publicity by lawyers, including participation
in public functions, shall not contain puffery, self-laudation,
claims regarding the quality of the lawyers' legal services, or
claims that cannot be measured or verified.
C. It is proper to include information, provided its dissemination
does not violate the provisions of subdivisions (A) and (B) herein,
as to
1. education, degrees and other scholastic distinctions; dates of
admission to any bar; areas of the law in which the lawyer or
law firm practices, as authorized 'by the Code of Professional
Responsibility; public offices and teaching positions held;
memberships in bar associations or other professional socie-
ties or organizations, including offices and committee assign-
ments therein; foreign language fluency;
2. names of clients regularly represented, provided that the cli-
ent has given prior written consent;
3. bank references; credit arrangements accepted; prepaid or
group legal services programs in which the attorney or firm
participates;
4. legal fees for initial consultation; contingent fee rates in civil
matters when accompanied by a statement disclosing whether
percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs
and disbursements; range of fees for services, provided that
there be available to the public free of charge a written state-
ment clearly describing the scope of each advertised service;
hourly rates; and fixed fees for specified legal services.
D. Advertising and publicity shall be designed to educate the public
to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information rele-
vant to the selection of the most appropriate counsel. Informa-
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tion other than that specifically authorized in subdivision (C)
that is consistent with these purposes may be disseminated pro-
viding that it does not violate any other provisions of this rule.
E. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal
services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the
public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each
advertised service, which statement shall be delivered to the cli-
ent at the time of retainer for any such service. Such legal serv-
ices shall include all those services which are recognized as
reasonable and necessary under local custom in the area of prac-
tice in the community where the services are performed.
F. If the advertisement is broadcast, it shall be prerecorded or taped
and approved for broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording or
videotape of the actual transmission shall be retained by the law-
yer for a period of not less than one year following such
transmission.
G. If a lawyer or law firm advertises a range of fees or an hourly rate
for services, the lawyer or law firm may not charge more than the
fee advertised for such services. If a lawyer or law firm adver-
tises a fixed fee for specified legal services, or performs services
described in a fee schedule, the lawyer or law firm may not
charge more than the fixed fee for such stated legal service as set
forth in the advertisement or fee schedule, unless the client
agrees in writing that the services performed or to be performed
were not legal services referred to or implied in the advertisement
or in the fee schedule and, further, that a different fee arrange-
ment shall apply to the transaction.
H. Unless otherwise specified in the advertisement, if a lawyer pub-
lishes any fee information authorized under this rule in a publi-
cation which is published more frequently than once per month,
the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein for
a period of not less than 30 days after such publication. If a
lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under this rule
in a publication which is published once per month or less fre-
quently, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made
therein until the publication of the succeeding issue. If a lawyer
publishes any fee information authorized under this rule in a
publication which has no fixed date for publication of a suc-
ceeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation
made therein for a reasonable period of time after publication,
but in no event less than 90 days.
I. Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any fee infor-
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mation authorized under this rule, the lawyer shall be bound by
any representation made therein for a period of not less than 30
days after such broadcast.
J. A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to rep-
resentatives of the press, radio, television or other communica-
tion medium in anticipation of or in return for professional
publicity in a news item.
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices and Signs.
A. A lawyer or law firm may use professional cards, professional
announcement cards, office signs, letterheads or similar profes-
sional notices or devices, provided the same do not violate any
statute or court rule, and are in accordance with DR 2-101, in-
cluding the following:
2. A professional announcement card stating new or changed as-
sociations or addresses, change of firm name, or similar mat-
ters pertaining to the professional offices of a lawyer or law
firm, which may be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends and relatives. It may state biographical data,
the names of members of the firm and associates and the
names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of
succession. It shall not state the nature of the practice except
as permitted under DR 2-105.
DR 2-103 Solicitation and Recommendation of Professional
Employment.
A. A lawyer shall not solicit employment as a private practitioner of
himself or herself, a partner or an associate from a person who
has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer in viola-
tion of any statute or court rule. Actions permitted by DR 2-104
and advertising in accordance with DR 2-101 shall not be
deemed solicitation in violation of this provision.
D. A lawyer or the lawyer's partner or associate or any other affili-
ated lawyer may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may
cooperate with one of the following offices or organizations
which promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of a part-
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ner or associate or any other affiliated lawyer if there is no inter-
ference with the exercise of independent professional judgment
on behalf of the client:
4. Any bona fide organization which recommends, furnishes or
pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided
the following conditions are satisfied:
a. Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized
and operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendi-
tion of legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organiza-
tion is organized for profit, the legal services are not
rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or se-
lected by it except in connection with matters where such
organization bears ultimate liability of its member or
beneficiary.
b. Neither the lawyer, nor the lawyer's partner, nor associate,
nor any other affiliated lawyer nor any non-lawyer, shall
have initiated or promoted such organization for the pri-
mary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to
such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
c. Such organization is not operated for the purpose of pro-
curing legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a
private practitioner outside of the legal services program of
the organization.
d. The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are
furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in the matter.
e. Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal
services furnished or paid for by the organization may, if
such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other
than that furnished, selected or approved by the organiza-
tion for the particular matter involved; and the legal ser-
vice plan of such organization provides appropriate relief
for any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that rep-
resentation by counsel furnished, selected or approved
would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the cir-
cumstances of the matter involved; and the plan provides
an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief.
f. The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such
organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court
1990 AMENDMENTS
or other legal requirements that govern its legal service
operations.
g. Such organization has filed with the appropriate discipli-
nary authority at least annually a report with respect to its
legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its schedule of
benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel
and financial results of its legal service activities or, if it has
failed to do so, the lawyer does not know or have cause to
know of such failure.
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
F. If success in asserting rights or defenses of a client in litigation in
the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of
others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services.
A. A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect
an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
B. A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a law-
yer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to
be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer.
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by
circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client.
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7. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or law-
yers performing the services.
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
C. A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or col-
lect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case.
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
A. A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another
lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of the lawyer's law
firm or law office, unless:
1. The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a
full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
2. The division is made in proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each.
3. The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
A. In general.
2. In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment
until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foresee-
able prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to
which the client is entitled and complying with applicable
laws and rules.
C. Permissive withdrawal.
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request per-
mission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and
may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such
withdrawal is because:
1. The client:
a. Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not war-
ranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good
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faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.
b. Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.
c. Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct which is
illegal or prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
d. By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the
lawyer to carry out employment effectively.
e. Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the
lawyer engage in conduct which is contrary to the judg-
ment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules.
f. Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the
lawyer as to expenses or fees.
2. The lawyer's continued employment is likely to result in a vio-
lation of a Disciplinary Rule.
3. The lawyer's inability to work with co-counsel indicates that
the best interests of the client likely will be served by
withdrawal.
4. The lawyer's mental or physical condition renders it difficult
for the lawyer to carry out the employment effectively.
5. The lawyer's client knowingly and freely assents to termina-
tion of the employment.
6. The lawyer believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending
before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of
other good cause for withdrawal.
CANON 5
A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on
Behalf of a Client
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 5-4 If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is
permitted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publica-
tion rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he may
be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his own antici-
pated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who
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obtains from his client television, radio, motion picture, newspaper,
magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect to the case
may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of con-
duct that will enhance the value of his publication rights to the preju-
dice of his client. To prevent these potentially differing interests, such
arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination
of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though
his employment has previously ended.
EC 5-8 A financial interest in the outcome of litigation also results if
monetary advances are made by the lawyer to his client. Although
this assistance generally is not encouraged, there are instances when it
is not improper to make loans to a client. For example, the advancing
or guaranteeing of payment of the costs and expenses of litigation by a
lawyer may be the only way a client can enforce his cause of action,
but the ultimate liability for such costs and expenses must be that of
the client.
EC 5-18 A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar
entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, direc-
tor, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with
the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its
interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by
the personal desires of any person or organization. Occasionally a
lawyer for an entity is requested by a stockholder, director, officer,
employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity to
represent him in an individual capacity; in such case the lawyer may
serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced that differing in-
terests are not present.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer
May Impair His Independent Professional
Judgment.
B. A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pend-
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ing litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm ought to be called as a witness, except that he may under-
take the employment and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify:
1. If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
2. If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and
there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be
offered in opposition to the testimony.
3. If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to
the client.
4. As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship
on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or
his firm as counsel in the particular case.
DR 5-102 Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a
Witness.
A. If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending lit-
igation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he
shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any,
shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he may
continue the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may
testify in the circumstances enumerated in DR 5-101(B) (1)
through (4).
B. If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending lit-
igation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client,
he may continue the representation until it is apparent that his
testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation.
B. While representing a client in connection with contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee finan-
cial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or
guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, ex-
penses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and
costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client
remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
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DR 5-104 Limiting Business Relations with a Client.
B. Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his
employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or
understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he
acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the sub-
ject matter of his employment or proposed employment.
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the
Interests of Another Client May Impair the
Independent Professional Judgment of the
Lawyer.
D. If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw
from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his
or his firm may accept or continue such employment.
CANON 6
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently.
* * *
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 6-4 Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use proper
care to safeguard the interests of his client. If a lawyer has accepted
employment in a matter beyond his competence but in which he ex-
pected to become competent, he should diligently undertake the work
and study necessary to qualify himself. In addition to being qualified
to handle a particular matter, his obligation to his client requires him
to prepare adequately for and give appropriate attention to his legal
work.
EC 6-6 A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit
his individual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who
handles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to
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limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not
handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do
so. A lawyer who is a stockholder in or is associated with a profes-
sional legal corporation may, however, limit his liability for malprac-
tice of his associates in the corporation, but only to the extent
permitted by law.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 6-102 Limiting Liability to Client.
A. A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his
liability to his client for his personal malpractice.
CANON 7
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the
Bounds of the Law
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does
not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with considera-
tion all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the inflic-
tion of needless harm.
EC 7-14 A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative
to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation
that is obviously unfair. A government lawyer not having such dis-
cretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy
submitted to him should so advise his superiors and recommend the
avoidance of unfair litigation. A government lawyer in a civil action
or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and
to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or
the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring
about unjust settlements or results.
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DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct.
B. In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:
1. Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him
to be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is
not disclosed by opposing counsel.
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity.
A. A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-
judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication and that does
more than state without elaboration:
1. Information contained in a public record.
2. That the investigation is in progress.
3. The general scope of the investigation including a description
of the offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the
victim.
4. A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assist-
ance in other matters and the information necessary thereto.
5. A warning to the public of any dangers.
B. A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense
of a criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a
complaint, information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest
warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the trial or disposi-
tion without trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-
nated by means of public communication and that relates to:
1. The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including
arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
2. The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a
lesser offense.
3. The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
statement given by the accused or his refusal or failure to
make a statement.
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4. The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or
tests.
5. The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective
witness.
6. Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
evidence, or the merits of the case.
C. DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from
announcing:
1. The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the
accused.
2. If the accused has not been apprehended, any information
necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of
any dangers he may present.
3. A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
4. The identity of the victim of the crime.
5. The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use
of weapons.
6. The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
7. At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence
seized, other than a confession, admission, or statement.
8. The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
9. Quotations from or references to public records of the court in
the case.
10. The scheduling or result of any step. in the judicial
proceedings.
11. That the accused denies the charges made against him.
D. During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a
lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-
judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication and that relates
to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are
reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that he may
quote from or refer without comment to public records of the
court in the case.
E. After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a
criminal matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer
or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not
make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public
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communication and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposi-
tion of sentence.
F. The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional
disciplinary proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings
when pertinent and consistent with other law applicable to such
proceedings.
G. A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not dur-
ing its investigation or litigation make or participate in making
an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or refer-
ence to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to
be disseminated by means of public communication and that re-
lates to:
1. Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
2. The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, wit-
ness, or prospective witness.
3. The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
4. His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a
party, except as required by law or administrative rule.
5. Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial of the action.
H. During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer
or law firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in
making a statement, other than a quotation from or reference to
public records, that a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by means of public communication if it is made
outside the official course of the proceeding and relates to:
1. Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
2. The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, wit-
ness, or prospective witness.
3. Physical evidence or the performance or results of any exami-
nations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to
such.
4. His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or posi-
tions of an interested person.
5. Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
hearing.
1. The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer
from replying to charges of misconduct publicly made against
him or from participating in the proceedings of legislative, ad-
ministrative, or other investigative bodies.
J. A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees
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and associates from making an extrajudicial statement that he
would be prohibited from making under DR 7-107.
CANON 8
Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 8-4 Whenever a lawyer seeks legislative or administrative changes,
he should identify the capacity in which he appears, whether on be-
half of himself, a client, or the public. A lawyer may advocate such
changes on behalf of a client even though he does not agree with
them. But when a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he
should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously believes
to be in the public interest.
CANON 9
A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 9-101 Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety.
B. A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee.
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
A. All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than ad-
vances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more
identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the
law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law
firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
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1. Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be de-
posited therein.
2. Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or
potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited
therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm
may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or
law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event
the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute
is finally resolved.
B. A lawyer shall:
1. Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities,
or other properties.
2. Identify and label securities and properties of a client
promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or
other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
3. Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other
properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer
and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.
4. Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client
the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of
the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.
DEFINITIONS
As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
2. "Law firm" includes a professional legal corporation.
6. "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory
bodies.
* * *
